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West Europe Report

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25 February 1986

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

NEYTS ON POSITION OF FLEMISH LIBERAL PARTY

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 21-22 Dec 85 p 3

[Interview with Annemie Neyts, president of the PVV, by G. Dz, and V. d. W.:
Brussels; date not specified]

[Text] In her modern office where the new president of the PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress] holds forth, newsmen were coming and going. All of them, even foreign journalists, had come to take a close look at Annemie Neyts; the woman whose likeness was plastered all over the Belgian capital on the eve of the elections of 13 October 1985. "Annemie answers" one could read on one of the five slogans displayed on the posters. And she did indeed answer our questions--in faultless French, incidentally.

[Question] Don't you have the impression of being a plaything heading the PVV?

[Answer] I don't believe so. I have had 4 years' experience as secretary of state. I think that the work I did there prompted some people to ask me to assume the party's presidency.

[Question] Party presidents have less power today than under earlier legislatures. Doesn't it bother you to remain in the shadow?

[Answer] It does not bother me. I have always found that the growing weight of party government represented a pernicious evolution in political life.

I shall not play the role of mother-in-law to the government as was the case with the party presidents between 1976 and 1980. I was a member of the cabinet for 4 years; I would not have liked the party president to tell me what to do then.

The Verhofstadt Line

[Question] Will you be following the neoliberal line that Guy Verhofstadt has blocked out for the PVV?

[Answer] I don't have the intention of changing the party line because I believe that it is basically sound. But it is obvious that I have a

different type of personality. Well then, say what you will, a party president inevitably becomes the face and voice of the party. I am who I am. I believe, then, that this will involve changes in emphasis over time. In my district of Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde, the PVV is an eminently popular party.

[Question] Is the right-leaning speech of the former party president not responsible for the electoral loss experienced by the PVV?

[Answer] It is true that we lost six deputy seats in parliament. We had hit a historic "peak" in 1981 and we had won a certain number of marginal seats. The mere drop of 0.75 percent made us lose four seats right away. We find ourselves at the level where we were in 1978, which represents the second best showing of the PVV.

I believe that people have unjustly stuck the label of right-wing liberal on Mr Verhofstadt, pitilessly, with little generosity. This is due to the role that he played at the time of the party congresses of 1979 and 1970 when he indeed adopted a certain number of radical positions. What was involved was an ideological program that had not yet undergone the acid test of the reality of things.

[Question] Do you shun ideologies?

[Answer] I don't like ideologies which become kinds of catechism. I prefer by far to start with the reality of things.

Like a Detergent Powder

[Question] You conducted a very personal electoral campaign. Don't you believe that the people voted more for an image than for ideas?

[Answer] That is hard to determine.

[Question] Who created your campaign posters?

[Answer] I undertook my electoral campaign of 1981 more or less singlehandedly; it was amateurish. The outcome reflected the measure of the preparation. At the communal elections of 1982 where I took the risk of appearing at the head of the Brussels slate, my campaign was already run more professionally with the help of marketing and promotional experts. At the European elections I made a good personal showing: I won 7,500 votes in the Brussels district, 12,000 votes across Flanders, even though my name was near the bottom of the slate.

For the legislative elections we said: "It is now or never." The specialists in political promotion diagnosed the situation. My image was deemed too bland. The campaign thus led to achieve two goals: to build up my image very significantly and to secure the support of the largest number of voters. The public relations people decided to focus exclusively on the product, on me, Annemie. But the five campaign posters nevertheless contained

a political message: Here is the individual, here is what she is and how she acts. Hence the slogans were "Annemie listens," "Annemie answers," "Annemie decides," "Annemie serves Brussels," and plain "Annemie."

[Question] Aren't you upset by the fact that this political message was advertised just like a plain detergent?

[Answer] The creators of detergent will tell you that a detergent is not created just like that. This is even true for political candidates. Recall the campaign focusing on Mr Baguette. It was a marvelous attempt to project a political personality out of nothing. It was a total failure.

[Question] Don't you have the feeling that this Brussels executive is weaker than the previous one. Francois-Xavier de Donnea, the president, divides his time between this position and that of minister of national defense, and your successor, Jan Bascour, hails from Lennik-St Quentin....

[Answer] Ethics require that an outgoing minister show reserve with reference to the position that he has occupied. What seems more important to me is the governmental agreement that I helped to negotiate. It is important for two reasons. On the one hand, it marked the end of the status quo: Brussels emerged from the superfreezer. On the other hand, the agreement opened the way to a discussion among the inhabitants of Brussels: It must bear on the institutional, political, administrative organization of the area occupied by Brussels.

Brussels has indeed fewer funds than before the start of regionalization. But this process is irreversible. Brussels can then no longer claim as self-evident, as a fact, its function of capital. Brussels must give indications of opening up, must negotiate with the other two regions to continue to be accepted as a capital. The residents of Brussels can thus no longer consider the rest of the country as an immense playing field at their disposal, as had been the case in the 19th century.

Accordingly, additional funds will no longer be budgeted to Brussels automatically, without discussion. Brussels has to depend much more on itself than before. I favor the merging of certain Brussels communes. Politically, the matter is not simple and I know that many inhabitants remain attached to their autonomous commune. Still, some functions would be enormously enhanced by being integrated. This is an extraordinary challenge. It will be up to the citizens of Brussels to meet them, whether under the aegis of their executive or not depending on its dynamism.

Two Difficult Years

[Question] To what other section of the government's statement do you also attach great importance?

[Answer] The budgetary goals and specifically the liberal emphasis on this issue. The budget must be balanced much more by putting a cap on expenditure than by increasing revenues. These limitations must be realized

essentially by adapting the machinery of outlays rather than by impacting on the beneficiaries of these outlays. But this will call for political courage. In the field of health care, for example, it is more difficult to attack the intermediary institutions than the sick. The 1986 and 1987 budget years will be difficult, but if we refuse to cope with this problem the subsequent obstacles will be even more insurmountable.

[Question] One point in the government agreement seems to disturb you--the extension of military service--does it not?

[Answer] We are not ready to accept an extension of military service before reexamining the entire system of exemptions, the organization of the service, and its improvement. For the time being, one young man out of two is doing his service: If the draft time is extended even more, the discrimination will become that much greater.

[Question] Following the elections of 13 October 1985, Flanders has for the most part remained under the control of the CVP. This was reflected in the makeup of the Flemish executive. What is your influence?

[Answer] We have three liberal members out of a nine-member Flemish executive. The Social Christians are thus twice as numerous. But the division of responsibilities is better balanced than it used to be under the previous executive where Gaston Geens used to monopolize the responsibilities for the regional prime ministership, economic development, scientific research, budget and finance, and the entire area of personnel management. This is no longer the case today since budget and finance are the responsibility of the regional vice premier minister, Louis Waltniel (PVV). In the field of policy and personnel management, the other members of the executive will have the right of initiative. Each promotion or nomination will have to bear the signature of the minister of the budget.

[Question] How do you coexist with the Christians in your party?

[Answer] I have no problem. I am not one of those products of Catholic education who spend the rest of their lives making amends for the ideas received. In my home we have always been very tolerant: I took courses in religion in primary schools and I took formal communion. I am not a believer but this has never posed a problem.

[Question] In the PVV don't you have a problem of political personalities?

[Answer] It is true that the PVV of 1971 was led by outstanding personalities such as Willy De Clercq, Frans Grootjans, Mr Vanderpoorten, and Herman De Croo who dominated the life of the PVV. The succeeding generation did not have the opportunity to surface or was possibly less well-endowed in terms of heavyweights. Then came the generation of Guy Verhofstadt. Patrick Dewael, and their colleagues. Miraculously, I have nevertheless succeeded in emerging before they did since I am 9 years older than Guy Verhofstadt: I am 41 years old.

[Question] This Saturday you will be the only candidate running for your party's presidency. Is this because no one else has sought the position?

[Answer] Guy Verhofstadt was the only candidate in 1982. I was endorsed for the party's presidency by a sizable number of district federations which were not obliged to do it. The fact that I used to be acting party president is also an advantage.

[Question] Do you have contacts with your opposite number, Louis Michel, president of the PRL?

[Answer] Yes, but we have to improve these contacts further. The PRL and the PVV are two separate parties which at times have different orientations. However, they belong to the same family and it should thus be possible to restore or develop a dialogue between us. But the impetus for this should come from both sides.

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CSO: 3619/17

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

PUETZHOFFEN POSITIONED FOR TOP SPOT IN UNITED NRW CDU

Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 21 Oct 85 p 4

[Article by Gerd Kroencke: "Quick Climb of a Previous Unknown"]

[Text] Krefeld's Dieter Puetzhofen - Rival for Biedenkopf just as for Kohl

The national chairman of the CDU first waited a while. After his previous favorite, Bernhard Worms, failed so miserably, Helmut Kohl avoided the new kid from the lower Rhine. Whether or not Kohl had tried to block the Mayor of Krefeld, Dieter Puetzhofen, on his way to the top of the Rhineland CDU, by his sending forth State Secretary Wolfgang Vogt, cannot be ruled out. In any case, with or without Kohl's blessing, the amateurish attempt clearly failed. Only now this coming Friday (25 Oct 85) has the man from Krefeld been invited by Kohl for a breakfast, beginning at 8:30 a.m. for "sixty minutes", as Puetzhofen remarked, as if that were a bit meager.

Whether or not a new spirit has entered into the Rhineland CDU along with the new man has yet to be seen. A new vitality is there in any case. There was a striking contrast: the departing chairman Bernhard Worms gave his last statement of accounts not without bitter undertones in a very polished manner, as is his style - and he was sent off with polite applause. Then there was the way Puetzhofen arrived. Light and easygoing, he gave the last Rhineland CDU Party Congress delegates the feeling that now things could really get moving ahead.

That he got 82 percent of the vote right from the start may show what the party can expect from a man who was until recently known only in Krefeld and its immediate area. Right from the start, Puetzhofen made it known that he really intended to make a new start: a comprehensive lead resolution, which still bore all too clearly the non-binding signature of his predecessor, was not passed due to Puetzhofen's intervention. Puetzhofen immediately added his weight to the scales after his own election, and before the election of the Land managing subcommittee. His appeal for the election of two women was successful. His intraparty opponent, Wolfgang Vogt, on the other hand, failed. "There are manners of conduct," said Puetzhofen, in reference to Vogt's resentment, "which you shouldn't exceed."

For the time being, the man from Krefeld is declining to declare his candidacy for the top post in the combined Land (North Rhine - Westphalia) party organization, but it would only be logical because after the planned fusion of the Rhineland and Westphalia the chairmanship of the old posts would be meaningless. The question is if Dieter Puetzhofen's quick climb signifies not only the end of the Worms episode, but also the end of the resurrection of Kurt Biedenkopf. Whether and how Puetzhofen settles up with Biedenkopf could provide a clear indication of how the Union's top leadership on the Rhine and in the Ruhr will get along in the future. In any case, Puetzhofen says, "I won't consider the question of whether I will permit any sort of argument with Mr. Biedenkopf."

Puetzhofen, who has no mandate in the Bundestag or in the Land Assembly, will need to take a long breath. He wants to strengthen the Party organization, as he currently complains "that a party like the North Rhine - Westphalian is not so attractive." With the election of a common chairman, a preliminary decision will already be made early next year for the CDU lead candidate in the 1990 Land-wide elections. Should Johannes Rau, as the defeated candidate for Chancellor, return home to Duesseldorf, a man like Puetzhofen could be dangerous for him.

13071

CSO 3620/0089

POLITICAL

FRANCE

OPINIONS ON MITTERRAND, FABIOUS, POLITICIANS, TRENDS

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 7 Dec 85 pp 140-142

[Article by Charles Rebois: "A Drop of 8 Points in a Month: The Collapse of Fabius"....]

[Text] The French have scheduled rotation. The December poll shows that this prospect influences the general atmosphere (5% more optimists and 6% fewer pessimists) and the men who still hold power appear like figures of the past.

First Laurent Fabius. The "youthful old prime minister" sees his share collapse. He loses 8 points at one swoop. Fifty percent of those polled no longer have any confidence in him to solve the problems which France now faces compared with 41 percent who express a contrary opinion. The drop is 10 points in the answers to the question about the role he could play during the coming months and years.

Since last April, the credit of the head of the government dropped from 59% to 41% (-18%) with two spectacular breaks, the first in June (July poll) and the second at the end of October (December poll).

Some exact facts explain this double drop.

In June: on the 13th, Michel Rocard announces his candidacy for the Elysee; on the 14th in Marseille, Laurent Fabius presents himself as the natural leader of the socialists and joins conflict with Lionel Jospin; on the 24th, Francois Mitterrand attacks the communist party; on the 26th, the proportional method of voting is adopted. It is a turning point. The PC does poorly in the polls and opinion with the revelation of the existence of a "war of leaders" in the socialist camp. Laurent Fabius suffers from it severely.

Second break: On 27 October, when the inquiry for the November poll had just been completed, the televised Chirac-Fabius

confrontation led to the embarrassment of the latter. The French discovered the real character of the young prime minister whom Francois Mitterrand had given them, that of an arrogant Rastignac concealed under a mask of tolerance. It was more than a mistake. There was deception about the real nature of the person. He will not be forgiven.

Thus, the champion of modernity who was to mobilize those disappointed by socialism during the parliamentary election campaign is prematurely disqualified.

But if the French condemn Laurent Fabius, they know that they will still have to deal with Francois Mitterrand in 1986. Forty-three percent (+2%) now express confidence in the chief of state compared with 51% (-4%) who express their misgivings. The presidential proportion settled to the lowest level in over a year. It is recovering at the very time when that of the prime minister is sagging severely.

One has often said that if socialist ideology has failed, the personalities of the left were saved. One offers as proof of it, the inability of opposition personalities to regain the favor of the French. This opinion will have to be revised. The only figures of the left who are advancing are Jacques Delors (+4%) and Pierre Maurot (+3%). They no longer belong to the government and are not included among the prime minister's friends.

On the other hand, the opposition leaders are regaining part of the lost ground. With a gain of 6 points, Simone Veil (+6%) returns to the head of the group. Raymond Barre (+1%) is patiently increasing his store of confidence, although only appearing in second position. As for Jacques Chirac (+5%), he is closing the gap with great strides. His performance with Laurent Fabius has helped him, also his omnipresence on the election front as the leader of the main opposition party. He also has a bonus of (+3%) with Jacques Toubon, his chief lieutenant.

Handicapped in the polls for a long time, President Valery Giscard d'Estaing (+4%) is beginning a rise which is the result of his tireless efforts to unite the opposition.

A prime minister in free fall, socialist personalities who are marking time, opposition leaders who are regilding their coat of arms, so many signs to remember, 100 days before the parliamentary elections.

Mitterrand: + 2

[Question] Do you have complete confidence, some confidence or not much confidence or no confidence at all in Francois Mitterrand to solve the problems which France faces now?

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Complete confidence.....	7)	-)
Some confidence.....	36) 43	+2) +2
Not much confidence.....	27)	-2) -3
No confidence at all.....	24) 51	-1) -3
No opinion.....	6	+1
	100%	100%

Fabius: - 8

[Question] Do you have complete confidence, some confidence or no confidence at all in Laurent Fabius to solve the problems which France faces now?

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Complete confidence.....	7)	-2)
Some confidence.....	34) 41	-6) -8
Not much confidence.....	24)	+3)
No confidence at all.....	26) 50	+6) +9
No opinion	9	-1
	100%	100%

The Political Figures of the Majority

[Question] In the case of each one of the following political figures, please tell me if you would like to see him or her play an important role in the coming months and years.

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Michel Rocard	59	+1
Jacques Delors	42	+6
Laurent Fabius	38	-10
Charles Hernu	35	not available
Jean-Pierre Chevenement	33	-
Lionel Jospin	30	-
Pierre Mauroy	24	+3
Pierre Beregovoy	22	+2
George Marchais	10	+1

The Political Figures of the Opposition

[Question] In the case of each one of the following political figures, please tell me if you would like to see him or her play an important role in the coming months and years.

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Simone Veil	47	+6
Raymond Barre	44	+1
Jacques Chirac	40	+5
Francois Leotard	38	+1
V. Giscard d'Estaing	30	+4
J. Chaban Delmas	29	+4
Jacques Toubon	26	+3
Jean-Marie Le Pen	15	-3
Rene Monory	14	-1

SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] technical data

Poll conducted by FIGARO-MAGAZINE.

Date conducted: 22 to 28 November 1985.

National sample of 1,000 persons representative of the French population 18 years old and over.

Proportion method (sex, age, profession of head of household PCS [not further identified]) and classification by region and types of urban areas.

The share of the political parties

	PC	PS	MRG [Left Radicals]	UDF	RPR	National Front
Good opinion	14	46	25	41	43	11
Bad opinion	71	43	44	41	41	73

The Priority:

still unemployment

[Question] Among the following subjects, which one do you think the government must give priority to now?

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Fight against rising prices.....	9	-
Fight against unemployment	68	+2
Fight against violence and crime	15	-2
Maintaining domestic tranquility	7	+1
No opinion	<u>1</u>	<u>-1</u>
	100%	100%

Increased Prices and Unemployment

Fifty-nine percent consider the battle against inflation ineffective

[Question] Regarding the struggle against rising prices, do you consider the government's action is...

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Very effective	4)	+2)
Fairly effective	32) 36	+3) +5
Not very effective	43)	-3)
Not effective at all	16) 59	-2) -5
No opinion	<u>5</u>	<u>-</u>
	100%	100%

Eighty percent consider the battle against unemployment ineffective

[Question] As regards the battle against unemployment, do you think that government action is...

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Very effective	1)	+1)
Fairly effective	15) 16	+3) +4
Not very effective	48)	-1)
Not effective at all	32) 80	-3) -4
No opinion	4	-
	100%	100%

Optimism and Pessimism

Forty-nine percent think that things are going to get worse

[Question] When you look at the way in which France and the French are developing, do you have the impression that things are improving or on the contrary, that they have a tendency to get worse?

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Things are improving	19	+5
They have a tendency to get worse	49	-5
There is no change	29	-2
No opinion	3	+2
	100%	100%

Thirty-nine percent think there will be many social conflicts...

[Question] Do you think there will be many or few social conflicts in the 2 or 3 coming months?

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Many social conflicts	39	-8
Few social conflicts	44	+7
No opinion	<u>17</u>	<u>+1</u>
	100%	100%

And 29% fear a resort to violence

[Question] In your opinion, the main problems which are going to arise in France in the next 2 or 3 years...

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
will be solved by negotiation and compromise	58	+4
or...they threaten to lead to resort to confrontation and violence	29	-7
No opinion	<u>13</u>	<u>+3</u>
	100%	100%

France's Role in the World

Forty percent think that France's role in the world is declining

[Question] Do you think that France's role in the world is now strengthening or declining?

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Is strengthening	22	+3
Is declining	40	-3
There is no change	30	-
No opinion	<u>8</u>	<u>-</u>
	100%	100%

8490

CS0: 3519/92

POLITICAL

FRANCE

SERIOUSNESS OF MITTERRAND-FABIUS RIFT DISCUSSED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 14 Dec 85 pp 108-110

[Article by Jean Bothorel: "One Hundred days of Difficulty for the French Prime Minister."]

[Text] In spite of all the "appeasing efforts" made Monday evening by Francois Mitterrand, the divorce between him and his prime minister is quite genuine. From now on, Laurent Fabius is "kept on a leash." And the president is going to hold the first rank in the next 3 months.

It was a wild and unusual week. Nothing indicated that the surprise visit of General Jaruzelski to the Elysee Palace was going to publicize a distressing dispute which had been brewing for months between Laurent Fabius and Francois Mitterrand.

It is not new for a difference to arise between the chief of state and his prime minister under the Fifth Republic. On the contrary: degrees of tension between the two heads of the executive branch are the rule, not the exception.

However, we have just witnessed an original spectacle for at least two reasons. On one hand, a prime minister had never yet selected the rostrum of the national assembly to express his "dissent" about a presidential initiative. On the other hand, a prime minister never had abruptly broken with the Elysee, 100 days before a decisive election for his majority.

Such behavior was not based, as George Marchais said on "a planned action." It is the culmination of a slow and concealed deterioration of relations between Francois Mitterrand and Laurent Fabius. A story which began last May when the question arose: who, the prime minister or the first secretary of the PS will lead the parliamentary battle?

Contrary to the impression which prevails, the famous "he is himself and I am myself" which Fabius declared on 5 September 1984 on the broadcast the Hour of Truth, would have hardly irritated the chief of state. The fact that his "young prime minister" shows a quiet desire for emancipation, using an effective statement, what is more legitimate after all? Relations between Mitterrand and Fabius were marked for a long time by a mutual affectionate admiration. This is rare enough to be noticed. The prime minister appeared like the beloved grandson of the prince, an image which, moreover, was very poorly accepted by the PS leadership.

This honeymoon extended without any real dissension until the spring of 1985. On that date the socialist leaders were in the process of outlining their election strategy. Was it necessary, as Laurent Fabius desired, to expand and attempt to organize around a "republican front," or rather was it necessary as Lionel Jospin demanded, for the PS to remain the PS, by exorcising the demons of an assumed "recentralization"? Jospin--supported by his main lieutenants--mounted the battlements regularly on the subject of the ideological perpetuity of his party and "the anchorage on the left." Facing this agitation and these great declarations of principle, Matignon's tactic was to observe and wait. Laurent Fabius, in fact, was not in a hurry; he thought it was necessary for this bouillon of ideas and cultures to pour off gently. After which, with the support of Francois Mitterrand, he would assert himself very naturally as the leader of the election campaign.

A Feeling of Incomprehension

Alas! The prime minister's calculation was going to be thwarted by the ruthless offensive of Lionel Jospin who wrote on 22 June in a seven page letter addressed to the 130 members of the PS Executive Committee: "The question of knowing who is leading the PS now and what the party decides itself is the responsibility of the executive committee...The PS will direct the campaign itself in all its aspects: political agenda, slogans, discussions on alliances, decisions on organization and the mobilization of the necessary facilities." Finally, the first secretary rejected the PS merging in a republican front and intends, on the contrary, for his party to become "the motive force of an extensive recruitment of the left."

It was a declaration of war against the prime minister. It left Laurent Fabius aghast, who expressed his "feeling of incomprehension."

In fact, the correspondence of Lionel Jospin was a challenge to Francois Mitterrand: from now on, should not the latter decide?

No president of the republic had been in a similar situation. Did De Gaulle ever have to choose between his prime minister and the UNR [Union for the New Republic] Secretary General? Closer to us, did Valery Giscard d'Estaing have to settle publicly a conflict of authority between Raymond Barre and Jean-Pierre Soisson?

One knows Francois Mitterrand made a judgment of Salomon. On the other hand, it was not known that Laurent Fabius interpreted the president's attitude as an implied disavowal. He expected clear and detailed support, along the social democratic line--it is necessary to call a spade a spade--which is his. He felt let down.

The spell between the two men was broken. All the more so since at the same time, the prime minister played very poorly his "lightning rod" role for the chief of state. It must be remembered that on 31 December 1984, Mitterrand declared, offering his best wishes to the French: "Let us look at 1985 well: nothing which cannot be overcome, everything is within our grasp. I approach it with unflinching determination. I hope, one will have the opportunity to notice it." Now, 6 months later his unpopularity is still high. In short, one does not see anything come, while Laurent Fabius rarely puts himself in the front line to serve as a shield--in the logic of the Fifth Republic--for his president.

In this deteriorated atmosphere, the Greenpeace Affair takes place. It is going to reveal the exceptional distrust which characterizes the relations between the five actors of this astonishing bungle: Francois Mitterrand, Laurent Fabius, Charles Hernu, Pierre Joxe and Roland Dumas. Without dwelling here on the "affair" itself, the many vicissitudes which will happen between the sabotage of the Rainbow Warrior on 10 July, and Charles Hernu's resignation on 20 September, all point in the same direction: the prime minister tries to clear himself, devotes all his energy, to not knowing, to not "being compromised" and consequently does not observe his function as a screen, a "fuse" between the Elysee and the government. Laurent Fabius did not make a single decision at any time, without protecting himself under the umbrella of the president of the republic. It was so with the mission entrusted to Bernard Tricot; it was so especially in the way in which the minister of defense resigned.

Let us remember. Thursday evening on 19 September, after LE MONDE had "revealed the existence of a third DGSE [General Directorate for External Security] team in New Zealand, which

reportedly carried out the attack, Francois Mitterrand addresses a public letter to his prime minister. Stating that "this situation cannot last any longer," the chief of state declares: "We must immediately proceed to remove the persons responsible for these mistakes." On Friday the 20th, Laurent Fabius answers him in a letter which is also public that he will take the necessary measures, while covering himself admirably. His letter is a model of disengagement: everything which he did since the beginning of the "affair," he did it because the chief of state had asked it of him. He never became the champion of the president of the republic. He plays more the part of public prosecutor: the ludicrous escapade of the Rainbow Warrior, it is not my style, Laurent Fabius. I do not agree to assume responsibility for the incompetence and amateurism which characterize the Greenpeace Operation from beginning to end. Besides, the prime minister's circle does not bother to show its colors: "They stonewall because they cannot allow themselves to be involved in this dirty affair."

However this exchange of letters is fraught with consequences. Everything takes place as if Francois Mitterrand and Laurent Fabius want to call on public opinion to witness their mutual decisions. It no longer involves governing together, but protecting themselves, each one on his own, in the eyes of the French. A strange method of governing which strains relations a little bit more between the Elysee and Matignon.

However, the prime minister will manage to turn around a situation which appeared lost. At the socialist congress in Toulouse on 11 October, one expected Michel Rocard; it is Laurent Fabius who is rediscovered, pugnacious, cruel, sure of himself.

The Divorce is Consummated

After the cold showers of summer, has he recovered his courage? His success in Toulouse is a sham. It is due to the counter performance of the mayor of Conflans-Sainte-Honorine. One will realize it 2 weeks later, 27 October--the prime minister's black Sunday--at the time of the confrontation with Jacques Chirac. What happened that day? Laurent Fabius had the opportunity of confiding afterwards. He was "disconnected" in a literal sense; he suddenly wondered what he did there on a television screen before millions of Frenchmen. He experienced what the professionals call "a blank." Fatigue? It was more than that. At the end of October and in spite of his performance in Toulouse, he is no longer a prime minister who has the confidence of the president of the republic and he knows it. The team is broken up. The man doubts himself, the ideas he must defend and his role in the election campaign. It is that man who confronts Jacques Chirac. How could he be "good"?

Far from wanting to minimize the scope of this smarting failure, the entourage at the Elysee coins some clever phrases about the prime minister's "inexperience." The chief of state in person allows himself to indulge in confidences with some journalists. In the PS jokes spread and occupy most of the time of the socialist general staff. It is the death blow.

Francois Mitterrand will give the coup de grace at his press conference on Thursday 21 November, when he states: "I declare that the immigrants are welcome in France. Whoever has another argument has the argument of hate or racist segregation." Without mincing matters, he corrected his prime minister who had expressed his agreement with most of Jacques Chirac's ideas on the subject. Certain notables of the left, moreover, did not fail to emphasize, vying with each other, the scope of the president's words, as if the latter erased Laurent Fabius' poor performance before the RPR leader. On Friday, the 22nd, the prime minister goes on sick leave, a diplomatic malady. He was to receive Jacques Delors. The meeting was postponed. Has there been an explanation between Mitterrand and Fabius since this Friday? Or rather, is it an additional sign of the depressing uneasiness which affects the head of government?

It is necessary to evaluate in this perspective, the indignation--or the "distress"--of the prime minister about the welcome given General Jaruzelski. We have every reason to believe that Laurent Fabius indeed proposed his resignation to the chief of state and that he did it in writing, at the latest Wednesday morning 4 December. Matignon did not refrain from presenting the prime minister's point of view: he could not accept being misunderstood on a question connected with political morals and the rights of man because of a presidential initiative and consequently he must say so clearly. On his part, Francois Mitterrand admitted at Jean-Pierre Elkabbach's microphone that "Fabius is a sincere man." Is this a graceful way of explaining that his sincerity, under the circumstances, was too loud or too ostentatious to be true?

It is strange, in any case, that having fixed a date in such a spectacular way before the deputies, the prime minister hesitated on the edge of an outright break. The two men settled matters. One went--a classic setting--when tension rises at the summit--as far as organizing a family lunch bringing together Francois, Daniele, Laurent and Francoise. What could they say to each other? Nothing, obviously. Henceforth the divorce is consummated.

Laurent Fabius is under the control of the chief of state, like never before. No thoughtless remark, no affirmation of his

specific responsibilities will be allowed him. As for his authority with respect to the PS, it is definitely jeopardized. There he is in the costume of a prime minister kept on a leash. He will have to survive 100 days in this position as uncomfortable as it is fantastic. One hundred days which will be painful for him every moment. They could be ruinous for his future.

Francois Mitterrand, on his part, seems to want to return to the front of the stage to lead his troops to the parliamentary battle. Is it by necessity? It is not very probable that he will manage, by exposing himself, to check the bewildering disintegration which is affecting his 7-year term.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

PROSPECTS IN LIGHT OF MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS DISCUSSED

Athens ENA in Greek 9 Jan 86 p 11

/From the "Counter to the Current" column by Panos Loukakos: "Prospects for 1986"/

/Text/ In this country it is well for one to avoid making predictions. Not only because conditions are fluid and change from moment to moment. Not only because people change opinions from hour to hour. But because many are those who intentionally mislead those whom they can mislead. At least this was the lesson in 1985. And, of course, nothing shows that many things will change in 1986. For that reason let us put aside "information" that comes from official and unofficial sources about forthcoming activities and future intentions but let us simply limit ourselves to describe the basic political facts of 1986 so that through them some conclusions might come forth --if they should come forth.

So, the first political fact is the economic crisis and its repercussions. Not only in 1986 but at least for the next 2 years the policy of economy cannot be abandoned because neither the economic capability exists nor do certain commitments that have already been assumed permit it so that the Greek economy might be supported from abroad.

The second political fact, the municipal elections. They will take place in October of this year and the major battle will be waged in the big municipalities. This battle will be waged by PASOK, paying the cost of the economic crisis and at the same time confronting a particularly strong attack from its left and right. The results of the municipal elections will be final and the major element that will determine future developments.

If PASOK does not show a marked drop in its strength in these elections then it is certain that it still has a great governing future. If, on the other hand, it should lose the big municipalities and its electoral strength decreases generally speaking, then it is certain that we are heading toward significant political developments in the first months of 1987.

This is so because if PASOK is defeated in the municipal elections, the government opposition-- primarily ND-- will begin maintaining that, as revealed by the popular verdict, there is at last conflict between the makeup of the Chamber of Deputies and popular opinion, demanding the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and the calling for early elections. Political pressures that would be exercised under such conditions would certainly be so great that Prime Minister Papandreu would shortly have to make certain decisions.

One of these decisions might be his leap to the office of the presidency of the republic if he should realize that there is no possibility for PASOK gaining a third electoral victory. A second possible decision might be early elections so that the crisis might abate. A third possibility might be the formation of a government having broader cooperation so as to confront the crisis.

In other words, the scenario being shaped at present is as follows:

Despite the economic crisis, despite strikes and worker reactions, the government will arrive at the municipal elections in October 1986 without great unexpected events. If it should win these elections it finally will solidify Mr Andreas Papandreou's firm political supremacy. If Mr Papandreou was not censured last fall for his economic policy he will never be censured for anything. If, on the other hand, PASOK loses the elections the road is opened for political developments that, at any rate, will be difficult to take shape before the first months of 1987.

All of this, of course, will have their effects on ND. If Mr Mitsotakis manages to get as far as the municipal elections and win them, then no one would be able to challenge him any longer. If, on the other hand, he loses these elections too, then he should give up the leadership of the major government opposition party the very next day.

Regardless of how things stand, October 1986 is the critical month of the new year. All subsequent developments will depend on that month since all possibilities up to then remain open.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

PROSPECTS FOR MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS REVIEWED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 12 Jan 86 p 5

/Article by Kh. K. Bousbourelis/

/Excerpts/ The municipal elections issue has already begun to take shape 9 months before they will be held, i.e. 12-19 October 1986. Since it will be the first official popular verdict some 16 months after the 1985 elections and a whole year after the announcement of the economy measures these elections should be the leading political event of the year that is just beginning.

Normally, since these are municipal elections and, indeed, coming a whole year after the announcement of the economy measures --that is, in a period of time when these measures will not have produced results, consequently continuing to be unpopular-- one must consider that the government has something to lose and the government opposition something to gain. The only thing is that matters are a little more complicated. The famous Eurodim poll taken last November had shown losses for both PASOK and ND compared to the June 1985 elections in four and not five districts of the Athens basin. PASOK dropped from 44 percent to 32 percent, while ND dropped from 38 percent in 1985 to 37.5 percent (divided into 32.5 percent for ND itself and 5.5 percent for DI. ANA. /Democratic Renewal/). PASOK's 12 whole percentage point loss is due to the repatriation of communist voters (3 percent for each of the communist parties) and to the disappointment of the remainder who in the long run declared themselves as undecided. Since the battle of the minds will take place in the big municipalities, where it is evident that the strength of the conservative party (well, a little bit liberal since they insist on it) has reached its limits, one may ask what more could this party expect to gain in the big municipalities from what it gained in 1985?

The most characteristic example will certainly be Athens. In order to win Athens municipality, the conservative party must still and under the best possible conditions secure the support of the communist Left --or at least its abstention-- in the second electoral round. Since everything is possible in Greece we might even see this happen under certain conditions. The most significant condition would be to discover or invent that personality, incorruptible, young, bright, without the original sin of active service in ND, a personality that would be able to take voters away from PASOK so as to take first place in the first electoral round and be so tolerable to the communist Left that its voters would vote for it in the second electoral round --with or without the permission of its leadership.

In other words, the conservatives could get Athens if in the meantime some Messiah "is born unto them." But if, indeed, they do manage to discover or invent such a Messiah, then it is certain that all will be disposed to worship him. All the followers, not, however, ND's cadres and especially not its leader because on the day after the triumph of the Messiah he will have to begin packing up from Regillis Street.

If, on the other hand, a Messiah is not invented, ND is in danger of seeing the "independent" candidate that it will support remain in third place during the first electoral round. For Athens especially this is not within the realm of the impossible. There is already one mayoral candidate from the party who reportedly has decided to enter as an independent if he does not get the blessing of the party. This is Mr Zakhos Khatzifotiou. If there should be a second conservative candidate from DI. ANA. and also a third extreme rightist, what would happen then? When, indeed, there is the possibility, following the expected name change by the KKE (Int.), that PASOK's leftist wing might prefer a personality who has authority and who impresses PASOK's leftist wing should he become a joint candidate. Then the expected triumph will end up as a complete disaster from which ND will not be able to recover.

The municipal elections in October will certainly be the leading political event of 1986. Even though it is still early, one would not hazard much to maintain that as of now the one who remains not only the most charismatic political personality of the country and also the most talented in matters of political tactics will come out on top, as this column has been saying since May 1984.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

REPORTED SECRET POLL SHOWS PASOK LOSING GROUND

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 19 Jan 86 p 3

/Text/ According to a poll conducted for the government (and for Mr Papandreu personally) by a reliable polling organization, PASOK comes out as the number two party. The poll was conducted throughout Greece during the first 10 days of November (following the devaluation of the drachma). A total of 2,500 persons were polled. The results were as follows: ND 39 percent and PASOK 38 percent. Of course, the results have disturbed the government because it is the first time since the 2 June elections that in a strictly secret poll PASOK comes out as the number two party regardless of the degree of percentage it lost.

According to information, the poll shows a large number of undecided voters and an even larger percentage of persons who refused to answer. After the figures were processed it was determined that 72 percent of those who refused to answer had voted for PASOK in the last elections. This fact is judged to be especially significant because usually the followers of the government party, when indeed it had recently won elections, answer with great willingness as compared to those who belong to the government opposition parties. The picture is completed by the fact that the biggest percentage of those undecided (they answered "I don't know" when asked if they would today vote for the party they voted for on 2 June) were PASOK voters in the last elections.

Poll analysts as well as political observers interpret the results of the poll as follows:

- A big percentage of PASOK voters --much greater than the one that gave it the recent election victory-- would not vote for it today. Nevertheless, these voters have not yet decided to join one of the opposition parties.
- Most of the "disappointed" PASOK voters belong to the democratic sector and a relatively small percentage to the Marxist Left. This means that the two communist parties, and especially the KKE, have not gained anything more from the strength that PASOK seized from them in the last elections with the "ploy" of the "anti-right rallying together."
- With regard to ND, its strength appears substantially stronger if one takes into consideration the fact that the same polling organization, in a poll conducted one week prior to the elections, had given 38.5 percent to PASOK and 35 percent to ND. Despite all of this, however, PASOK's "disappointed" voters still appear

rather reticent in joining the major government opposition party. Political experts are interpreting the situation as follows:

1. ND internal frictions and especially their exaggeration by a segment of the press, might not have unsettled the party's followers but at the same time they have not constituted a pole of attraction for those who are leaving PASOK.
2. The fact that PASOK had taken over the government for a second time just 6 months ago causes many people to believe that it cannot cease being the party in power for a period shorter than that provided for by the constitution.
3. Voters, besides ND followers, had doubts --last November-- as to whether the ND leadership would be able to lead the party to the February congress. They thus did not decide to express their preferences for a political group whose cohesion and leadership they did not consider as a given fact.

The poll analysts emphasize that those queried do not appear to have realized the significance of the government's measures last October (either positively or negatively) and only the psychological factor influenced their position. They stress that they can have a formed opinion only if they are queried after the first 10 days of February.

Political observers note that it is up to ND to pick up PASOK's dissatisfied members. They point out also that the picture of the party has significantly improved since mid-December. Contributing to this was the course of the pre-congress, the certainty that Mr K. Mitsotakis is leading the party to a congress with substantial participation by the grass roots that appears to be decided to definitely isolate anyone who attempts to create problems even as to the "picture" of the party.

They also add that Mr Mitsotakis' appearances in the Chamber of Deputies, the party's political speech and the positive activation of the party's deputies and cadres are being judged favorably --for the first time after the elections-- by the entire electoral body and not only by the party grass roots.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

PASOK OPTIMISTIC EXPECTATIONS DOUBTED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 5 Jan 86 p 3

/Article by I.K. Pretenderis/

/Excerpts/ It is a common secret that PASOK's party mechanism is not going through its most productive period of its life. The election of the new executive office, the announcement of the restrictive economic policy and the departure of Mr K. Laliotis have all had serious intra-party repercussions concerning which no one expects that they will be overcome in the next 24 hours.

This organizational breakdown is revealed both in centrifugal tendencies being manifested in the trade union sector and also in the more general intra-party psychological climate whose major constituent element is not enthusiasm.

It is a fact, nevertheless, that the feeling among high-level party organs is that "the storm has passed." According to this evaluation,

- The wave of social demonstrations that the rightist and leftist opposition tried to organize "for opposition reasons" did not find broad support and is already decreasing. Some high-level officials believe that there might be some small increase in the spring but others seem to share the opinion that "things in the social arena will be better."

- Centrifugal tendencies (but also intra-party gnashing of teeth) that have been observed in the trade union sector primarily will gradually begin to wane. The main argument here is the incapability of the purged trade unionists to form a credible political vehicle. High-level PASOK officials maintain that they will not go far through their presence alone.

Of course, it is not the first time in the last few months that the party leadership is making optimistic evaluations in order to give the lie to events. The latest "instance" was the forecast that no more than 100 trade unionists from the government ranks were scheduled to convene at the "President." In the long run, the number of those attending surpassed 400. Subsequently, memoranda from trade union and student quarters do not always attest to such optimism.

As much as it seems unusual, however, the opposition to the government's economic policy is not the major problem facing PASOK. According to high-level party officials, the provinces have not up to now shown any special "sensitivity" to the economic policy.

On the other hand, the major problem seems to be centered on the more general "impatience" that has taken hold of the party apparatus and that has increased over discontent over the economic policy. Indeed, it is not at all by chance that intra-party criticism is increasing all the more with regard to a whole series of issues that have to do with the "style and character of power" and is not limited to some shallow evaluations of the type "we are or we are not engaging in a rightist policy....."

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POLITICAL

GREECE

LEFT'S DILEMMA: HOW, WHEN TO COUNTER PASOK

Athens KYRIAKATI KI ELEVTHEROTIPIA in Greek 19 Jan 86 p 48

/Article by Panos Loukakos/

/Excerpts/ Great uncertainty has recently prevailed within the communist Left. It is not only the KKE (Int.) that has been embroiled in the question of realignment and upgrading. It is also the KKE that with one eye on KKE (Int.) developments and the other eye on its own internal crisis that although it is not trumpeted publicly continues to be evident. Thus, the communist Left today has turned inwards more than at any other time. If one were to exclude its attacks made on economic policy issues, politically speaking it is altogether absent from the scene. This is so because since it is occupied with its own major internal problems it does not have the capability to intervene in prevailing daily political developments by pronouncing its own comments.

At this time, therefore, the major problem within the KKE (Int.) is whether it will remain the party of the Euro-communists or will become the party of the Euro-leftists, whether it will maintain its present title or change it. All of this, of course, with strong internal dramatics that might at some point threaten its cohesion.

Within the KKE, on the other hand, there prevails "subdued optimism" that soon it will be the sole party to be called communist. At the same time, it is preparing for the forthcoming municipal elections with the same spirit and same conditions that prevailed in all of the post-dictatorship elections up to now.

All of this is nice. It would have been even nicer if it had constituted the continuation of problem-solving with regard to the present course of the Left. If subsequent questions would be raised since some others had been answered previously, as, for example, why the communist Left dropped 12 percentage points overall in the last elections, while there were objective conditions that could have favored its upward course. Or why whenever there is a bigger political problem, Mr Papandreou manages to make the communist Left an accessory of his, taking away from it any possibility in intervening in developments. Or, finally, how PASOK succeeded in appropriating all of the slogans of the communist Left without the latter making a protest and without trying to defend itself from political invasions and pillaging of slogans and votes.

These are the important questions which the communist parties must now answer before the municipal elections in October arrive and they are once again slaughtered at the polls.

Here especially there should be efforts at problem-solving and lesser attention paid to titles or posters.

There have been many errors committed. Today, the only point that differentiates the communists from PASOK is their opposition to the economic measures and their objections to Mr Papandreu's economic policy. And for that reason the prime minister, facing his first substantial clash with the communist Left, became exasperated to the point where he called one the unnatural appendage with the Right and the other a patron of salons.

Of course, confrontation will continue and intensify as the municipal elections approach. PASOK will once again employ arguments about barren islands of exile of the Right and in general take out from the time depository of history the entire antiquated arsenal of populist anti-Right political speeches. This is well-known because the play had already been played before with, indeed, the same protagonists. The question is what will the communist Left do this time. Will it once again become PASOK's rear guard marching to a new electoral defeat? Will it still discuss titles and authority? Or will it formulate a new political speech that will relate to present conditions and problems? That political speech that could catch the attention of the broader strata of the Greek people, those beyond the traditional communist voters.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

DI ANA: MOVES, DEVELOPMENTS DESCRIBED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 19 Jan 86 pp 3-4

/Article by Mikhalis Dimitriou; passages in slantlines printed in boldface/

/Text/ The presence of Mr K. Stefanopoulos, DI ANA /Democratic Revival/ president, next to Mr Giannis Boutos at the banquet honoring the Greek deputy and Euro-deputy the other evening fired up discussions over developments in the so-called /"anti-Mitsotakis" Center-Right/ sector.

At the same time, the presence of some 1,500 deputies, politicians and other elements of our political life, as well as businessmen and former ND cadres at the banquet honoring Mr Boutos is another factor adding to the intense activity that characterizes those described as /"intermediaries"/ (between PASOK and ND).

This activity, either organizationally or from an ideological and political standpoint, is indicated by the following:

- The latest public pronouncements on the municipal elections (with separate candidacies) by DI ANA President Stefanopoulos and the --as we shall see-- new organizational makeup of his party.
- The political positions being promoted, the new initiatives (for example, the announcement about a /"national united social movement"/ and the "coinciding" processes on matters of principle and programs proclaimed by Mr G. Boutos, one of the very few Greek politicians with an internationalist perception.
- The statements of independent deputies, namely/Messrs Dionysis Livanos and Dim. Nianias,/ that /they do not want "PASOK's downfall that would be destructive for the country"/ and --mainly-- that they would vote for certain of the proposed new constitutional regulations.
- Contacts and problem-solving over ND's future by certain former deputies and politicians who reportedly will make known their opposition to "Mitsotakis' plans" during the second party congress scheduled to convene in Salonica in the middle of next month.

Without anyone downgrading the significance of the moves, discussions, intentions and ambitions that characterize the "intermediary center-rightist" domain at this time, one may at the same time observe certain of their major characteristics.

The first is that the belief has been created that a Center-Left party will be established /not merely as a result "of personal disagreements and clashes"/ but as a result of broader ideological and political differences.

For that reason, moreover, both Mr Stefanopoulos and Mr Boutos affirm that the possibility of their return to ND does not depend exclusively on Mr Mitsotakis' leadership but is also connected with the modernization of the party's ideology, program and structure.

Nevertheless, if one were to except the DI ANA party, processes toward unity among the "intermediaries" continue to be put off, while all the others --topped by Mr Giannis Boutos-- are maintaining a wait-and-see and "private" attitude.

Mr Stefanopoulos is reportedly unwilling to discuss anything having to do with the abolishment of DI ANA or its being absorbed by other elements or movements (even in the hypothetical case of Mr G. Rallis becoming politically independent). Mr Boutos has already announced the establishment of his own "national united social movement" but more to stress his political independence rather than to set up such organizational processes and, indeed, on an all-Greece level.

From their standpoint, Messrs D. Livanos and Dim. Nianias do not appear to be examining the idea of joining DI ANA, while their orientation seems to be to cooperate in a broader (up to a Center-Left) political movement, for example, headed by "moderate" PASOK cadres.

Even if DI ANA organizational officials assert that middle-level ND cadres are continuing to join up (as well as certain PASOK voters, according to them), almost all the "intermediaries" agree that /mass departures or purges of ND deputies is not expected./ Perhaps the case of /Deputy Mikh. Papagiannis/ is being discussed, whose relations with Mr Mitsotakis are at a low level since Mr Papagiannis' son is a leading cadre in the DI ANA youth group.

On the other hand, Mr Mitsotakis' moves are said to have created some narrow margins for maneuver among the "intermediaries" and primarily in DI ANA. Mr Mitsotakis' attacks that they constitute PASOK's "tail" are forcing certain individuals to give anti-PASOK examinations (that have recently increased) and to create some problems of /"isolation"/ for them.

The results of the municipal elections will certainly influence political developments decisively and --as the "anti-Mitsotakists" hope-- both ND and the Center-Right area. Many are those who even if they do not hope for the upsetting of Mr Mitsotakis believe that there will be new departures and purges and a new wave of people joining DI ANA as well as people declaring themselves independent. Everything seems to have been put off until October. Nevertheless, even prior to the municipal elections, Mr Stefanopoulos' party seems likely to distinguish itself as the major pole of attraction for the "renewed Right" since it will work, on a local level, for its own mayoral candidates with Messrs G. Boutos, Dion. Livanos, Dim. Nianias, etc.

No apparent prospects are in sight for DI ANA's or Mr Boutos' cooperation with the KODISO /Democratic Socialism Party/ of Mr Khar. Protopappas and with Mrs Virginia Tsouderou or Mr Giangos Pesmazoglou of whom the latter two seem to be maintaining discreet distance from Mr Mitsotakis but not from ND.

The belief that conditions have been created for a "Center-Right" party is further reinforced by certain common perceptions by the "Center-Right intermediaries" such as the simple proportional electoral system, opposition to "neo-liberalism" and preference for a "welfare state" (without intervention in the economy but more with an intermediary role), the historical reference to K. Karamanlis, self-criticism tendencies, new political behavior, "Europeanization" of political customs, etc.

In these matters, Mr Boutos has made the most concrete political proposal (and, indeed, with the use of Marxist-type terminology) with the major component being the reasoning of a modern bourgeois politician. Mr Stefanopoulos' DI ANA is systematically trying to promote "centrist" political positions together with persistent efforts to have all deputies acquire similar unity of views.

On an organizational level, DI ANA has formed two committees, one headed by Mr Nikos Anastasopoulos, deputy from Messinia, responsible for all organizations in southern Greece up to Thessalia, and one headed by Mr Th. Gatsos, deputy from Pella, (and members made up of former Deputies Stamos and Mavridis and Professor Mavridis), responsible for the 15 nomes of Makedonia and Thraki.

Appointed to be responsible for organizations abroad was attorney Theod. Georgiou, while Mrs Poly Ristou was appointed officer for the administration of party offices. The secretariat for local self-administration affairs is headed by Mr Khr. Moskhandreou (who also heads the committee for proposals of mayoral and community council head candidates of the Athens basin area), while another committee, made up of Deputies Th. Gatsos, K. Giatrakos, G. Moundzouridis and Khr. Moskhandreou, will select the mayoral candidates of the big cities.

The most probable candidacies up to now for the mayor's office in Athens is that of Deputy Stratis Stratigis and Municipal Councilor Nikos Giatrakos, while the candidate for Piraeus is Mr Giannis Katsafados. According to the same information, DI ANA has set up about 25 committees in the Athens basin area and in the provinces 90 percent of the nome officers.

In conclusion, the "Center-Right intermediaries" sector --with the pioneer in working out modern ideas being Mr G. Boutos assisted by Mr Kostis Stefanopoulos-- is making its presence felt all the more.

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CSO: 3521/87

POLITICAL

GREECE

FACTORS AFFECTING ND COURSE REVIEWED

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 22 Dec 85 pp 10-11

/Article by T. Athanasiadis/

/Excerpts/ ND's course in the new year will be very important given the fact that our political life is entering a new phase and also because developments are taking shape that will decisively influence its future. Both outside and inside factors will have an effect on ND's course, factors that will shape both the broader political landscape and the narrower party one, while at the same time it is expected that the overall picture of our political affairs will be cleared up, affairs that had been in a fluid state since the 1985 elections.

Foremost among the outside factors is undoubtedly the course of the country's economy. The expected aggravation of the economic situation, something unpleasant for all the Greek people regardless of their political affiliation, is certainly changing the psychology of the electoral body and its frame of mind that after 4 whole years of PASOK government rule is coming to a conclusion, comparing the present era of uncertainty, mental anguish, insecurity and dangers with the era of stability and prosperity that it lived with under ND governments.

Already, a recent poll conducted in Athens in an irreproachably scientific manner gives the lead to ND, for the very first time in 4 years, despite the withdrawal from it of the K. Stefanopoulos group and the creation of the DI. ANA. /Democratic Renewal/.

The economy will be the first big sector that will influence ND's course because of one additional reason: the major government opposition party will wage its biggest battles on the economy, performing its duty to the nation and people.

Another outside factor that will influence ND's course in 1986, and especially during the first 6 months, is the increase in terrorism. So long as terrorism rises so will public opinion recollect the security and order (to the extent possible, of course) that it enjoyed under ND and that would have continued now to be the same had PASOK, as the government opposition at that time, not followed a policy of tolerating terrorism that in essence encouraged terrorists and had consented to measures to exterminate it.

A third factor is certainly social unrest as a consequence to the economic crisis and the more general shaking of public opinion's confidence in the government's ability to effectively confront it and to govern the country responsibly. So long as social unrest spreads so will PASOK show another side of its personality. Authoritarianism. It now bring this authoritarianism out in the open in confronting its own trade union officials who believed in the demagogic techniques of their leader with regard to free dialogue and independent trade unionism and who now look dumbfoundedly upon the coup d'etat policy in their supreme organization, the GSEE /Greek General Confederation of Labor/.

Of course, discontent among the trade unionists might not fuel ND's party engine but it does inflate its sails with the wind caused by public opinion that is steadily turning in favor of the major government opposition party. Social unrest will spread, as it appears from the prospects of the Greek economy (OECD sees recovery in 1990) and from the government's incapability to open the way for investments (an indispensable condition for economic recovery) and to cut inflation and unemployment.

Another outside factor influencing ND's course up to the summer when the Chamber of Deputies recesses is the confrontation in the Chamber of Deputies of the major issues that Mr Papandreou had promised. Education, health, mass information media, and particularly the press, social policy, etc.

The most important of all --on a purely political level-- outside factors will be the results of the municipal elections.

It is certain that public opinion is waiting for PASOK at the ballot boxes in October 1986 in order to repay it for its being deceived since June 1985 about seeing better days.

To what extent discontent and exasperation of public opinion over PASOK's policies is leading it in the direction of ND will certainly become evident during the municipal elections that even from now Mr Mitsotakis has been emphasizing that he will politicize by throwing in the gauntlet of confrontation with PASOK.

However, many other things within ND will be judged from the outcome of the municipal elections. Consequently, the October 1986 race constitutes with regard to ND a common outside and inside factor for its further course.

Since the June 1985 elections this course has been marked by events that reveal internal frictions. The departure of Mr Stefanopoulos and his nine deputy friends as well as the departure of Messrs Boutos and Livanos and the purging of Mr Nianias is a result of these frictions.

Nevertheless, ND's "wounds" from these frictions do not appear to have affected it seriously. The grass roots continue to remain faithful to the party that reestablished democracy and to raise its banner. At the same time, they showed an astonishing "reflex," reacting to the "grumbling" and to the frictions created at the middle and high cadre level by calling for unity, without, of course, this meaning that they have given up the right to criticize.

ND's maintenance of its cohesion and its lengthy existence is due basically to three major factors:

1. To the fact that the people have acquired partisan awareness. That is, the awareness that the thing that unites them and that constitutes its characteristic point that differentiates them from the followers of other parties is their common ideology, their common belief in certain principles and their conviction that the party is above and beyond personalities. Persons come and go but the party remains. And it is exactly this awareness that has "armed" ND's followers, the anonymous workers of its force, to survive persecutions and pressures endured under 4 years of the PASOK partisan state and that has rendered them stronger today compared to 1981 when the party gave up power.

2. To the fact that its founder, Kon. Karamanlis, despite the fact that he moved over to the office of the presidency of the republic, never ceased being interested in the party's cohesion and fate, even when he was the above-party supreme authority and within the context of his mission and duties as chief of state.

It is to K. Karamanlis that a major part of party awareness that was acquired by ND's followers and members is due. He himself was the first to forge it with the pre-congress (1977) and congress (1979) in Khalkidiki. With the intra-party elections for the election of the party's operating organs. With the ideology with which he imbued it and formulated under the title radical liberalism.

3. To the fact that after K. Karamanlis political cadres came to ND's helm, cadres that were imbued with the same sentiments and the same belief in the party as he. Karamanlis' successors really showed that they are imbued with high political sensitivity that focuses on the fundamental principle that above and beyond their person, above the grandeur that power creates and that is both humanly justified and desirable, these men had and still have the unity of the party.

Consequently, the frictions that are observed at the middle cadre level, especially within the parliamentary group, are not provoking any damage to the party's cohesion or to its grass roots. They do, however, lessen its effectiveness as a battle party. As a party on which the great majority of the Greek people is pinning its hopes for the salvation of the country.

From the standpoint of generative causes, these frictions are the consequence not of party cliques, as is the case with PASOK, but of different evaluations over the strategy and tactics being followed as well as open dialogue that prevails within ND as contrasted with the government party where the "one man" principle and an "Inquisition" atmosphere prevails.

5671

CSO: 3521/81

POLITICAL

GREECE

KYP REORGANIZATION: UNPRECEDENTED STRIKE ANTICIPATED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 19 Jan 86 p 48

[Text] And nevertheless, the KYP [Central Intelligence Service]...is on strike! For the first time tomorrow, the employees of the secret services will be camping in front of the prime minister's residence in Kastri and asking that they be admitted by Mr Papandreou to discuss their requests.

This time, the employees of the secret services have also invited dozens of newsmen and photographers, so that from now on we'll know with whom we are dealing! Officially, the...camping of all the "KYP-ers" concerns certain claims of a financial nature. Unofficially, however, I am told that the demonstration is related to the declared wishes of the government (verbal so far, since the relative bill had been promised for last October and we are still waiting) to reorganize the service and change it into a civilian organization. I am even told that former KYP employees, who were let go in 1982, will also participate in the demonstration. Moreover, various...simple informers have expressed their support as well, because they are afraid that if the rumored changes take place, they may lose their "handlers!"

However, this whole affair has a certain background. When the government announced its intention to restructure the KYP, the employees' administrative council asked to be heard on this subject. When the relative presidential decrees were compiled, the government transmitted them to the council through the head of the KYP Gen Politis. The employees read them and declared that they are unalterably opposed, even if the council had sided publicly with the change to civilian status.

However, I have been informed that this does not in the least concern them, since they will not be promoted: Among the 1,200 civilian employees of the KYP, 200 have not even completed their secondary education, the large majority have only a high school education, while out of the more or less 200 holding a university degree, most entered the service after 1981.

In spite of all this, certain extremist moves and boastings of the council (of the type "there will be blood in Kastri if we are prevented from demonstrating") made some employees (even those who are not really enamored of the PASOK) to distance themselves from the council and to establish a Union of Scientific Personnel. Therefore, there may be a rift among the "blue" (with a lot of "black") and the "green" employees of the KYP.

The former speak about an intensification of the demonstrations (why not a hunger strike in front of the Akropolis?). The latter declare that they want the democratization of the KYP and its immediate restructuring.

As a result, the Turkish papers have found out about this affair and are joking about us in front-page articles.

The government is of course concerned about this problem and--at least so I am told--the bill that will be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies will not simply resume the KYP (to National Intelligence Service), but will also consider its employees' problems.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

CAVACO SILVA-EANES: COMMON POINTS, DIFFERENCES

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 Jan 86 p 4

[Article by J. C. B.: "Two Drops of Water"]

[Text] It can be said of them: they are like two drops of water. Their images almost fade one into the other, they are characterized by the regional accent, ideological vagueness is common to both of them, and their modest origins make brothers of them.

Antonio dos Santos Ramalho Eanes, 51, and Anibal Antonio Cavaco Silva, 46, are in opposite camps even if they seem made to share one.

Behind the scene in the presidential elections, they are conducting a struggle that has some dramatic aspects.

And this is happening at a time when there is, between Belem and Sao Bento, an institutional understanding seldom witnessed before during the PS-PSD government, that permits to view Eanes and Cavaco in the same struggle, sharing the concern to make the state moral and the ideal to make the parties bacteriologically pure.

What is most different between them is not age, nor the military versus the university status of the two, because both can be considered young politicians, and because academic clothing would not ill fit Eanes, and Cavaco Silva could easily don a military uniform.

What most distinguishes them is, above all, the fact that one of them, before becoming the leader of the PSD and prime minister, had enthusiastically bet on the candidate on whom he is still betting, of course, but now in a more distant manner, while the other, after having discouraged Costa Braz and having perhaps been "pushed" by Melo Antunes to launch Zenha's candidacy, ended up by supporting the latter in the kind of emotional tone that never characterized his double mandate.

Cavaco Silva used Freitas as a emblem in the Figueira da Foz congress that elected him leader of the PSD. It was Sa Carneiro's failed hypothesis: "One government, one president." However, the 6 October election results have made him realize that the best hypothesis is not the sole good hypothesis. And if

Freitas do Amaral in Belem would strengthen Cavaco's victorious "dynamic," the election of another candidate (especially if this candidate is Mario Soares), would be far from meaning the defeat of the 1985 "leader-revelation."

Overtaken by the Pintasilgo "hurricane," Ramalho Eanes witnessed the division of the PRD in the presidential elections before it could even be born as a political party. And the excellent third place it won in the parliamentary elections--almost competing with Cavaco Silva in last year's "revelations"--because shaky in the face of a possible splitting of votes, not only in the PRD area, but also among the communists.

Thence the difference in tone: for Cavaco, it is enough to keep this word, to support from a distance, convinced, as he is, that he could not lose all, no matter who is the winner. For Eanes, on the contrary, only victory would serve.

Only victory could help leave Belem without a loss of prestige; only victory would guarantee him a future without a painful "crossing of the desert"; only victory can give him the strength to rid the PRD of its notorious deficiencies; only victory will guarantee him the continuity that many Eanists consider essential so that the "change in the political system not be confused with that of the regime."

It can be said of them: they are like two drops of water. One, however, is cold. The other is boiling.

/9274

CSO: 3542/64

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

TYPICAL PROFILE OF MUNICIPAL LEADERS

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 13 Dec 85 pp 19R-22R

[Article by Jose Antonio Lema, Jose Manuel Fernandes and Luis Fraga]

[Text] Who are the presidents of the municipal chambers? What are their professions, ages, experience in local government? What factors influence the variations in the votes cast, municipality by municipality, when we compare the local elections with the legislative elections? These are the questions which these two studies, conducted with the aid of computers, seek to answer.

Armando Afonso Moreira, Social Democratic president of the municipal chamber of Vila Real, is married, aged 46, and has held the post for 9 years. He attended university and before he occupied his office in the Pacos do Concelho building, he was a secondary school teacher. He is the most typical of our 305 chamber presidents, the one who most closely fits the "robot" profile, the image of the average Portuguese municipal leader. What is that image? This is what we were looking for, based on an analysis which took into account such characteristics as age, civil status, profession, educational background and experience in local government. To this end, we conducted a study--the methodology for which is explained in these pages--covering 255 of the 305 chamber presidents.

The two most obvious--and expected--characteristics are that almost all the chamber presidents are married males.

In fact, only six women have reached the top of the municipal hierarchy. Three of them are Social Democrats--in Estarreja, Cascais and Santa Cruz da Graciosa (in the Azores)--and two are Socialists--in Peniche and Sardoal. One was put up by the PPM [Popular Monarchist Party]--in Vagos. Three of them are serving their first term, whereas only 15 percent of all the chamber presidents are completing their first term in municipal office. At least one of the women--Helena Roseta, in Cascais--will not be reelected, since she is not even a candidate.

So women are not well represented in the leadership of the municipal bodies. In fact, in these elections in which the local factor predominates, it is really difficult for a woman to project well enough to overcome the sexist resistance, which is still strong.

Table 1: Profile of Local Chamber Presidents Nationwide

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Finding</u>
Male	98 percent (only six women)
Married	96.5 percent
Attended university	34.5 percent
Attended secondary school	32.4 percent
Secondary school teacher	15.4 percent
Service-related occupation	15 percent
Serving third term	49.6 percent
--or second term	35.6 percent
Average age	46 years

Table 2: Profile of Local Chamber Presidents by Party Affiliation

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Socialist Party</u>
Male	97.6 percent (two women)
Married	97.2 percent
Attended university	28.4 percent
Completed secondary school	32.3 percent
Banker (or service-related occup.)	23.5 percent
Serving third term	55.6 percent
--or second term	30.6 percent
Average age	44 years

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>United People's Alliance</u>
Male	100 percent
Married	94.2 percent
Attended university	33.3 percent
--or secondary school	31.3 percent
Service-related occupation	28.3 percent
--or technical cadre	17 percent
Third term	44 percent
--or second term	42 percent
Average age	40 years

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Social Democratic Party</u>
Male	96.6 percent (only three women)
Married	98.9 percent
Completed secondary school	34.5 percent
Attended university	32.2 percent
Civil servant	21.6 percent
Secondary school teacher	15.9 percent
Third term	48.7 percent
--or second term	30.8 percent
Average age	48 years

Table 2 (con.)

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Democratic Alliance</u>
Male	100 percent)
Married	98 percent
Attended university	38.8 percent
Completed secondary school	32.7 percent
Secondary school teacher	20.4 percent
--or technical cadre	12.2 percent
Third term	52.3 percent
--or second term	40.9 percent
Average age	49 years
<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Social Democratic Center Party</u>
Male	100 percent
Married	88.9 percent (one divorce)
Attended university	46.2 percent
Completed secondary school	23.1 percent
Secondary school teacher	29.6 percent
--or technical cadre	37.5 percent
Third term	45.8 percent
--or second term	37.5 percent
Average age	50 years

'Ripe' Age

As mentioned, most of the chamber presidents are married. There are only 5 bachelors, 2 divorces and 2 widowers (in 255 responses). These results are consistent with the fact that most of the local leaders are in an age range from 30 to 70 years, in which marriage is the customary state. Although the relatively small number of divorces is [no] surprise, it is odd to note that one of the divorced presidents is a CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] member. (The other belongs to the APU [United People's Alliance].)

More curious is that, with regard to the age of chamber presidents, there are noticeable differences according to region, as can be observed on Map I. Nationwide, the smallest age group is what we would call the "ripe age." [Most presidents] are between 40 and 50 years old, the average age being 46 years.

In fact, two-fifths of the chamber presidents are about 40 years old. The trend is strongest in the districts of Aveiro, Beja, Braganca, Coimbra, Evora, Porto and Vila Real and the Azores. In contrast, the 40-year-olds are rarest in Leiria, Viana do Castelo and Viseu.

The district in which the average age of the Chamber presidents is the highest is Castelo Branco (53 years), followed by Guarda (51 years), Vila Real and Viseu (50). The youngest chamber presidents are concentrated in the south:

Evora (38 years), Porto Alegre and Setubal (41 years). It is evident that the age of the chamber presidents goes up as we move from the coast to the interior and from south to north. Map I [not reproduced] clearly shows this trend.

APU: Youngest

This age study also makes it quite easy to separate the different parties; on a rising scale in age, they are aligned from Left to Right: APU, 40 years; PS [Socialist Party], 44 years; PSD [Social Democratic Party], 48 years; and CDS, 50 years. The AD [Democratic Alliance] falls between the latter two parties, at 49 years.

It is not surprising that the APU elected the youngest chamber presidents-- in Portel and Nisa (both presidents are 27 years old), in Sobral de Monte Agraco (28 years old) and in Borba (29 years old). In contrast, the only two chamber presidents over 70 years of age are from the CDS: in Tabuaco (aged 72) and in Vila Nova de Ourem (80 years old). Oddly, at the extremes of this age range we find two physicians: Jose Manuel Basso, in Nisa, and Antonio da Silva Teixeira, in Vila Nova de Ourem.

This age distribution is somewhat at odds with the public image of the highest leaders of the various parties, particularly, of the APU (the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] leadership has the highest average age) and the CDS--whose most prominent national leaders for many years have been the dauphins of political life (Freitas do Amaral, Adelino Amaro da Costa, Lucas Pires).

Only Fourth Grade

Another characteristic which we analyzed was the educational background of the chamber presidents. The first noteworthy finding was the existence of at least 29 chamber presidents (out of the 246 who responded to this question) who had only the minimum educational requirement, i.e., fourth grade. Incidentally, only 4 of the 20 districts or autonomous regions do not have at least one chamber president in this group. They are Braga, Setubal and Vila Real districts and Madeira.

The greatest frequency of councilmen with minimal educational qualifications appears in Braganca District, where one-third of the chamber presidents did not go beyond primary school. This circumstance might be related to the fact that in this district of Tras-os-Montes there are also the most chamber presidents who are in business (proprietors, merchants, manufacturers).

The educational level of the local leaders also varies by party affiliation. Here the CDS has the advantage, presenting the highest rate of chamber presidents with university degrees (46.1 percent), followed closely by the AD (38.8 percent) and the APU (33 percent).

The lowest rate is registered by the Socialists (although the PS had a higher rate of non-response); the secondary school graduates predominated (62 percent). The PSD has the highest incidence of local leaders with only a minimum education (15 percent); the lowest incidence was registered for the APU (8.3 percent)

and the PS (8.8 percent). This factor is curious, since we would have tended to assume that the APU--whose local leaders would theoretically come from the lowest social strata--would present the largest number of municipal leaders with only a fourth-grade education.

This is probably an indication that the APU does not recruit the majority of its local elected officials from these social strata. This is, in fact, the case.

Services

While most of the APU chamber presidents had service-related occupations, second place went to technical cadres (engineers, economists, architects). Equally frequent were bankers, civil servants and secondary school teachers, although factory workers are also concentrated in the APU. In fact, six of the eight chamber presidents who are factory workers belong to the APU; the other two are Socialists. We also note the existence of three physicians, although we did not turn up a single attorney, which is not true of any of the other large parties. Finally, a small manufacturer was elected chamber president on an APU ticket: Emilio Rato, of Marinha Grande.

The Socialists present the largest number of bankers, and if we combine this profession with other service occupations (office workers and civil servants), we find that 62 percent of the PS chamber presidents come from these typically middle-class professions.

Teachers

It is interesting to note that the PS has recruited its local candidates from a class with particular local prominence: bankers. It is also certainly the local prestige which teachers enjoy which explains the weight of this professional class, particularly among the chamber presidents elected by the parties in the former AD; 30 percent of the CDS chamber presidents are secondary school teachers and another 7.5 percent are primary school teachers.

The importance of the teaching profession in being elected chamber president stands out particularly in such districts as Castelo Branco, Guarda, Viana do Castelo, Viseu and Vila Real; i.e. in districts where the rural vote is decisive and generally goes to the PSD or the CDS. More specifically, in Vila Real, 6 of the 13 chamber presidents for whom we have data were teachers before they were elected to local office.


Other occupations seen most frequently among office-holders elected by parties to the right of the political spectrum are linked to property (proprietors, merchants and manufacturers); they represent 18.3 percent of the combined CDS, PSD and AD councilmen. Technical cadres represent 11.6 percent. It is worth mentioning that no less than 20.6 percent of the PSD chamber presidents are civil servants, the highest percentage of all the parties. This might not have been expected in a party which is so averse to the public sector, but the fact is that, in the Azores, a region which is almost entirely Social Democrat and where only 2 of the 19 chambers are not controlled by the PSD,

II - CADRES

III - PROPRIETORS

IV - SERVICE OCCUPATIONS

V - TEACHERS



Maps II, III, IV and V show the districts (in gray) in which the different occupations are predominant among the chamber presidents. Striped areas indicate districts for which we did not have sufficient data (Coimbra, Santarém and Faro).

we find the largest percentage of civil servants--no less than 31.6 percent--serving as chamber presidents. Close behind is another Social Democratic district: Aveiro (31.2 percent). Only then comes Beja, which is solidly APU.

The other professional class which is represented most strongly among PSD office holders is that of attorney (8.0 percent)

Analyzing the distribution of occupations nationwide, aside from the already mentioned incidence of teachers, it is interesting to note (see maps II, III, IV and V):

--The concentration of property-linked occupations in the districts of Branco (perhaps the most backward district in the country) and Porto;

--The very broad distribution of service-related occupations (office workers, civil servants and bank workers), but with a high concentration in the southern and coastal districts (Beja, Evora, Setubal, Portalegre, Leiria, Aveiro and Braga) and in the autonomous regions of the Azores and Madeira;

--Technical cadres predominate in Braga, Lisbon and Evora.

The last characteristic considered in this study was length of experience in local government.

From the analysis of the data at our disposal (responses from 334 municipalities), the first conclusion is clear: the stability of local power; i.e., the stability of the municipal governments. In 110 (49.6 percent) of these municipalities, the current presidents have been members of the municipal executive for at least three terms. Moreover, 31 had some experience prior to the first local elections, generally acquired on administrative commissions.

In contrast, very few (only 35, or 15 percent) of the chamber presidents were serving their first term.

This stability varies according to the parties which the elected presidents represent. The Socialists have the largest number of presidents serving a third term, which is a good indication of how well the PS is entrenched in local power.

In fact, this party has succeeded in electing a large number of presidents in municipalities where the PS does not have a majority in legislative elections. The reason for this is that many of its local office holders are truly popular figures. With these figures presiding over the chambers, the Socialists have been able to hold on to many local governments which they otherwise would have lost.

Local Factor

It is somewhat different with the APU, in which only 34 of the office holders are in this position. Although the APU is the political force which, in terms of overall percentages, usually does the best in local elections, in which it obtains "scores" which are generally higher than those in the legislative elections, its influence is very solid and is independent of its candidates.

In other words, to insure victory, the APU does not always have to renominate the outgoing president (as in the case of the Socialists); it has more freedom to revise its ticket.

Regarding the CDS and PSD, parties whose electoral logic places them closer to the PS, they are hurt by the fact that a significant portion of the chamber presidencies which they hold were won back in 1975; 1979 was the year of the AD "tidal wave" which swept the Socialists out of the presidency of some dozens of municipal councils.

Also regarding the parties, it is noted that the only two local presidents elected on tickets of minor political forces (ASDI [Independent Social Democratic Action] and PPM) are both serving their third terms. This confirms the theory that candidates are valued for themselves and not for the parties which put them up. Incidentally, it was only in 1982 that these two men ran on the tickets of these two small parties for the first time.

One of the strangest contrasts is between the educational level of the local leaders and their length of service. Those with only a fourth-grade education have done the best at holding on to local office (56 percent of them are running for a third term) and those who have attended universities have done the worst (only 40 percent serve a third term). This relationship seems to indicate that the ease with which these individuals are elected to successive terms would have to be attributed to the same strong, winning personality which got them elected chamber president with only a fourth grade education, i.e., which made them popular figures.

On the other hand, the pay scale of chamber presidents may not be particularly attractive to cadres with better qualifications, which could help to explain why chamber presidents who have attended college tend to serve for a shorter time. We cannot be too sure about this deduction, however, because it is very difficult to establish any general rule. One need only consider, for example, the case of two liberal professions which can bring in a large income: the law and medicine. While the legal profession is well represented among chamber presidents who have served for 9 years or more (55 percent), the reverse is true of physicians (only 27 percent fall into this category).

This observation serves, incidentally, to underline the relative nature of this study, particularly since it is biased by the lack of data on a significant number of Socialist municipalities. Although the study enabled us to draw a profile of the average Portuguese municipal leader, i.e. to see what these chamber presidents have in common, it provided only a partial idea of the diversity of personalities, motivations and circumstances of these local government leaders. Well, the great value of local government is precisely this diversity, which makes each municipal election unique.

Variation in Voting Patterns Between Legislative and Local Elections

In a study of two types of elections--legislative and local--held close together, it was seen that, in Portuguese political life over the last 10 years, each party--be it the APU, PS, PSD or CDS--has experienced pronounced variations in votes and has exhibited distinctive behavior.

Why does a party make a better showing in local elections than in legislative elections? What effect do such factors as local entrenchment or the expedient vote and the ideological vote have in these results?

The following analysis may clarify these questions and define patterns of behavior among the voters of each political party in the two types of elections. First of all, it provides a clearer and more definite idea of the changes which next Sunday's elections will present, given the unexpected results of the 6 October legislative elections and the current distribution of local power.

The study was based on three periods in which there was a similar interval between the local and legislative elections: 1976 (elections for the AR (Assembly of the Republic) in April and local elections in December); 1979/1980 (local elections in December 1979 and legislative elections in October 1980); and, finally, 1982/1983 (local elections in December, as usual, and AR elections in April 1983). This comparative analysis of pairs of elections makes it possible to detect the zones where various forces are competing more intensely for votes--zones of conflict which are not revealed in studies of isolated elections.

More Abstention in Local Elections

The map showing overall voter variation [between the local and legislative elections] for all parties in the three periods combined and the map showing the variation in abstention rates are almost identical, which indicates that abstaining voters are largely responsible for the voting variation in practically all the municipalities in the country. The abstentions carry so much weight that they almost obscure the transfers of votes among the parties.

In fact, abstentions go up spectacularly throughout the country when local elections are held. In 1976, for example, abstentions in local elections were 50 to 60 percent higher than in the legislative elections. Of the 305 municipalities in the nation, there was only one--Cabeceiras de Basto, Braga District--in which more votes were cast in the local election than in the election for deputies to the AR. Incidentally, in 1979/1980 and 1982/1983, Cabeceiras de Basto was always included in the small group of municipalities which attributed more importance to the choice of their local representatives. Although the difference in the abstention rates in legislative and local elections gradually diminished in these last two periods, the abstention rate for local elections is still quite high, indicating that the people attach less importance to the local elections. On the other hand, the results in December 1982, in which abstentions rose less sharply, might mean that those elections benefited from the fact that they were held in a period of political crisis, with the breakup of the AD, and before the legislative elections, so the more intense political climate may have brought more voters out.

The local elections this 15 December will not take place under the same circumstances; the early legislative elections on 6 October and the presidential elections in January 1986 have resulted in a certain lack of interest in the political impact of the local elections, particularly among the very parties competing in them. The parties' capacity to mobilize the electorate may be

limited and there could be a new trend toward a significant abstention rate in next Sunday's local elections.

Consulting the map showing the variations in abstentions, it is also curious to note the geographic distribution of the zones where abstentions varied less for the two types of election: almost all of the Alentejo, Minho, Vila Real District and the mountain municipalities in the north of Viseu District. The explanation for this distribution may be that these are relatively homogeneous zones, politically, and party leaders have an easier time getting the voters out for both types of elections.

In a final comparison between the two maps, it is noted that, on the map showing variations in voting patterns, there are areas in black (where the variation was greatest) which do not correspond with the map showing variations in abstention rates (on which these areas appear in white). These black areas represent municipalities where the competition among the various parties is more intense and there are significant crossovers of votes: they include Ourique (a three-way contest between the PSD, PS and APU); Sesimbra (PS and APU); Fronteira and Monforte (PS, APU and AD); Alviarez (which has already had PS, AD and CDS chamber presidents); Aguiar da Beira, Fornos de Algodres and Figueira de Castelo Rodrigo (CDS, PSD, AD and PS) and Mesão Frio (PS, PSD and CDS).

Now let us look at the variations observed for each party, with reference to each of the three periods.

APU: Better Results in Local Elections

The APU is clearly the political force which obtains better results in local elections than in legislative elections. However, as seen on the map, since its electorate is concentrated in the south (with negligible weight in the center and north of the country), it is precisely in its zone of influence that it experiences the most marked variations, particularly in municipalities in which it competes with the PS, where the mechanism of the expedient vote causes a significant fringe of voters to oscillate between the two parties.

Thus, in 1976, when all the parties were just beginning to establish themselves locally, it was in the southern districts that some municipalities were giving less support to the APU in local elections than in the legislative elections. (Of the 16 municipalities in which this occurred, 14 were in zones where the APU was the dominant party). This could be attributed to the fact that the APU was competing with the PS in the legislative elections and the expedient vote favored the APU. In the north, there was a general but weak trend favoring the APU in the local elections, representing the recovery of some expedient votes lost to the PS in the legislative elections.

In the 1979/1980 and 1982/1983 periods, the focal point of the variation shifted to the zones bordering the PS strongholds (Algarve, Portalegre and Santarém), with the combined effect of two distinct types of behavior. In these zones, the local APU-controlled governments or the APU's local candidates

are preferred by an appreciable portion of the electorate which votes with the PS, because this is ~~more~~ expedient, in the legislative elections. On the other hand, in the north of the country the ideological vote tends to go to the APU in the legislative elections, accompanied by a loss of votes to the PS in the local elections. This was the case in 1979/1980 in the Beira Interior and in the northern textile industry zone. This trend was more accentuated in 1982/1983, and the APU campaign to establish itself locally in the north has begun to produce some results; in the Vouga valley and the Braga region, the APU is becoming competitive with the Socialists.

Still, it must be stressed that, generally speaking, the APU has shown the best local election/legislative election consistency in all three periods; in 1983, it lost no more than 5 or 6 percent of its electorate in any local election.

PS: Pros and Cons of Being Swing Party

The PS has an unstable electorate outside its strongholds. In the Alentejo, the greatest variation occurs in municipalities where it is in competition with the AD or the APU, municipalities which appear on the map as real cordons defining district borders.

In the north, those who vote with the PS in the legislative elections vote AD/PSD in the local elections, which--despite some exceptions--reveals its representatives' lack of local influence, since they cannot maintain the considerable force of the PS vote in the legislative elections.


In the three periods under analysis, the PS map shows the least variation in its own zone of influence, but it is precisely here that it experienced the great bloodletting on 6 October at the hands of the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party]. One of the most interesting revelations of Sunday's elections will be how this electorate behaves toward the PS local office-holders whom it already knows (in some cases) and toward the PRD competition. We are referring to the regions of the Vale to Tejo, Estremadura, the Algarve, Coimbra, Porto and areas in Braga District.

It can be said that the PS has clearly shown that it is at the center of the nation's political spectrum, showing up in each region to compete in the elections with the dominant parties there. This versatility, which has made the PS the "party on the Right" or the "party on the Left"--depending on the viewpoint of the regional majority--and which potentially could be a factor for growth, has to a large extent become a handicap because of contradictory policies which have managed to antagonize not only groups which are not a part of its constituency (AD and APU) but the base of its own party support (PRD).


In 1976, the PS rose prominently in the local elections in predominantly APU zones, benefiting from the votes of the more conservative electorate. As the pivot party, it also benefited from the expedient vote of the APU in the north (Guarda, Viseu and Tras-os-Montes). In the western region and the northern coast, it lost to the PPD [Popular Democratic Party], which has great local influence.

Maps show variation in voting patterns between legislative and local elections for all parties in all periods and variation in abstention rates.

General Variation



Variation in Abstentions



In 1979/1980, the appearance of the AD attracted some of the local Socialist voters in the legislative elections, specifically in the border region between Evora and Beja districts and in the Beira Interior.


In 1982/1983, the PS registered gains in the local elections, particularly in the coastal and urban zones. It lost votes only in the south (influence of the APU office holders), Coimbra, Vale do Douro and part of Tras-os-Montes (where the AD was strong in the local governments). The PS improved and balanced its constituency at the national level.

AD and PSD: Competition with the PS, Decline of the CDS


A comparison of the AD and PSD maps reveals that, in the south, their vote varied only in municipalities where they could compete for part of the PS electorate. In the north, where the voters are more fickle from the standpoint of party loyalty, the variations were marked in zones where the CDS vote went over to the PSD and between the AD and the PS, which occurred specifically in the Beira Litoral, Guarda, Braganca and the coastal zone of Leiria District.

Maps show variations in voting patterns between legislative and local elections for each party in the three periods under study. Black areas are those in which the variation exceeded 15 percent, gray area represent variations of 5 to 15 percent and in the white areas the variation was less than 5 percent. Dotted portions are areas in which the party did not compete.

APU




PS




AD



PSD



CDS



In the Beira Alta and Alto Douro, there was a close similarity among the three parties, based on their local characteristics, in which the ideological factor has little significance and the vote switches are numerous and complex. This is what happened with the PPD in 1976, which came out ahead in the local elections in broad areas where the CDS was not on the ballot.

In 1979/1980 the AD achieved better results in the legislative elections in APU and PS zones; in 1982/1983, despite its disorganization and the fact that it entered candidates in very few municipalities, the AD still managed to maintain the general trend of the previous period, with a stronger showing in the legislative elections than the PSD or the CDS (except for Vale do Tejo, in which the united conservative vote was no longer a factor).

CDS: Local Personalities

The CDS variation corresponded almost uniformly to its electoral decline from 1976 to 1983. Logically, as the map shows, the variation was much more pronounced in the zones where the Christian Democrats had been in power or were competing for it against the PPD/PSD.

In 1976, a similar pattern is noted in the legislative and local elections, which means that ideology was important to the electorate. In the south and center of the country where the CDS did not compete, its votes were switched directly to the PPD. In Tras-os-Montes and the Beira Interior, the variations reflect intense competition between these two parties, benefiting the party with the best local organization, and the switch of local leaders from one party to the other.

In 1982/1983, the CDS showed a marked loss of strength in the legislative elections compared with the local elections, with its votes going to the PSD (which, with Mota Pinto, managed to maintain its electoral equilibrium). For its part, the CDS began to lose its conservative ideological nature and its influence was based primarily on local personalities.

'PRD Effect': How Far-Reaching?

After its astonishing performance in the 6 October elections, the PRD is now faced with the responsibility of maintaining its image as the third major party, with 18 percent of the votes, a responsibility which it may not be ready to accept so soon, particularly in local elections that require organization and local implantation which the party clearly does not have. In fact, the PRD will not be competing in many of the local elections and even if it can hold on to the votes it won on 6 October in those municipalities where it is putting up candidates, it will see its national "score" drop to a half or a third of its showing in the legislative elections.

The PRD is not competing in about 80 municipalities where it received from 10 to 20 percent of the vote in the legislative elections, or in about 24 municipalities where it won more than 20 percent. While it is clear that the PS will basically be the party to benefit from the absence of the PRD, it is strange that Herminio Martinho's party is not putting up candidates in

most of the APU-controlled zones (Baixo and Alto Alentejo), nor in the central coast and interior. It will compete in most of the urban municipalities in Vale do Tejo and Castelo Branco (its strongest zone), Algarve and scattered municipalities in the north and central interior (where it received fewer votes). In these locations, the Socialists will again suffer the greatest effects from the PRD, but without the devastating breadth of the "PRD effect" on 6 October. Although the PS will certainly lose several chamber presidencies because of votes switched to the PRD, it could recover an appreciable percentage of the votes which deserted it in the legislative elections in October.

Note on Methodology

In calculating the variation in voting [between legislative and local elections] in the periods 1976, 1979/1980 and 1982/1983, both the declines and gains for each party are included. That is, the 5 percent which the APU gained in 1976 in Ourique in the legislative elections (relative to its vote in the local elections) does not cancel out the 5 percent which the APU lost in Ourique in 1982/1983 in the AR elections (relative to the results in the local elections). Both values count as variations which are cumulative and are reflected in the overall APU variation in Ourique. (The method of the quadratic means of the differences between legislative and local elections in each period was used.)

The keys on the maps represent the percentage by which a party vote varied on the average (losing, gaining or maintaining votes) between the two types of elections. The areas in black correspond to the largest variations, the grey areas represent intermediate changes and the areas in white represent the smallest variations.

Where it is indicated that a political party did not compete, this means that the party did not run in both types of election in any of the three periods studied.

Finally, it is noted that in the local elections the study was based on the votes for the municipal chambers and not for the municipal or parish assemblies.

6362

CSO: 3542/52

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POPULATION MOVEMENTS SHOW NONTRADITIONAL PATTERNS

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 Dec 85 p 11

[Text] The traditional attraction which Lisbon and Porto held for the mainland Portuguese population has declined in the past decade, in favor of the districts in the center of the country, the northern coast and the Algarve, notes a study by the IACEP [Institute of Situational Analysis and Planning Studies].

The IACEP document addresses the question of the changing pattern of internal migration observed in Portugal in the last decade.

In the period from 1973 to 1981, the study notes that 295,056 people, about 3.6 percent of the population of mainland Portugal in 1981, moved to a different district.

The districts involved in these moves were, on one hand, Lisbon and Setubal, which attracted the most people, and the Alentejo districts, which recorded the largest rate of emigration.

The IACEP document notes that, in 9 years, the highest rates of migration were recorded in the age group from 25 to 34 years, followed by the groups from 15 to 24 and over 60 years of age. The youngest age group shows the least inter-district migration on the mainland.

According to the IACEP analysts, the migrations are not geographically balanced. If one excludes the migratory movements in Lisbon and Setubal, which represent a reorganization of the population in the Lisbon metropolitan area, the districts in the interior, which represented 31.1 percent of the resident population, registered 46.5 percent of the migrations in the period under study.

Meanwhile, the coastal districts (including Faro) received 75 percent of the migrants. Taken together, Lisbon, Setubal and Porto were accounting for more than 50 percent of the "immigrations" registered on the mainland.

The result of the unbalanced migratory flow was that only five districts showed a positive balance of internal migration (more people entering than leaving): Setubal recorded a positive balance of 32,622 people, followed by Lisbon (9,539), Porto (6,935), Aveiro (2,158) and Faro (1,895).

The districts with a negative balance were in the Alentejo, the northern interior and the center of the country.

The study reveals that, in general, the indicators of the development of migratory movements clearly show a coast/interior separation.

In the period from 1973 to 1981, some 46.9 percent of all changes of residence were migrations between coastal districts, 31.6 percent were migrations from the interior to the coast, 15.5 percent were in the opposite direction and 6 percent were migrations between districts in the interior.

The study concludes that what characterized internal migrations in the last decade in Portugal were first, a reorganization of the population in the more developed coastal areas and, next, the strong attraction of these areas for the population in the less developed areas of the interior.

6362

CS0: 3542/53

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

ALMOST CORRECT PREDICTIONS--When everything is said and done, and with the necessary corrections, the first round's most probable outcome is a Freitas do Amaral victory with a percentage that will be above 40 percent, followed by Mario Soares (with a little over 20 percent), Salgado Zenha (with nearly 20 percent) and Lourdes Pintasilgo (around 15 percent). [Excerpt] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 Jan 86 p 3] /9274

APU SUPPORT TO ZENHA--Between 1530 and 1600 hours last January thirteenth a van owned by the Amadora Municipality (where the APU has the majority) unloaded all kinds of equipment in front of the Zenha candidacy offices in that city, located by Avenida Santos Matos. The van was a Dina Toyota and bore the license number CM-87-86. There are witnesses of this fact. For the candidate who affirms that he is not asking for anyone's support, this instance proves that he is accepting support--and a lot of it--from the APU. But there are other examples as well. A few days ago, witnesses in front of the PC headquarters in Lisbon, located on Soeiro Pereira Gomes Street, noted that officials from Alvaro Cunhal's party were preparing to load loudspeakers on a car used by the Zenha electoral campaign, as well as posters of Zenha himself. And all of this, before Veloso desisted in his favour.... [Text] [Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 21 Jan 86 p 20] /9274

ANOTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAW--The Ministry of International Administration is once again analyzing the Internal Security Law bill (the previous bill, prepared by the Mario Soares government, had been sent to the Assembly of the Republic for study, and its validity deadline has already expired). Our newspaper found out that the Ministry is thinking about preparing a new document (which will not be ready before next summer) and is also giving some thought to the reaction that the previous document had awakened. [Text] [Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 21 Jan 86 p 8] /9274

VELOSO ELECTION VIEWS--Asked yesterday in Coimbra about his preference for an election victory in case the second round is disputed between Mario Soares and Freitas do Amaral, candidate Angelo Veloso replied: "Neither." As for the hypothesis of a second round between Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo and the former CDS leader, would Veloso be ready to do for the former what he is now doing for Zenha? He replied: "Probably." [Excerpt] [Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 17 Jan 86 p 8] /9274

CSO: 3542/64

POLITICAL

TURKEY

CWP PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTION

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 9 Jan 86 pp 1, 13

[Interview with CWP General Chairman Husamettin Cindoruk by Ankara Bureau Chief Yalcin Dogan: "Constitutional Proposal, Content of Cindoruk's 'Formula for Democracy'"]

[Text] Ankara - Correct Way Party [CWP] Deputy General Chairman Mehmet Dulger brought an interesting proposal to the political agenda a couple of days ago. With the notion that there is a "regime problem" in Turkey as the point of departure, he proposed a three-step formula to get rid of it. According to his proposal, a constitutional convention must first be formed, then the constitutional convention must write a new constitution and, after that, elections must be held.

The proposal of a "constitutional convention" by a civilian body for the first time since Ottoman days, presenting Turkey with a new political agenda, is something which in our opinion must be discussed, not overlooking the debate over the "validity" of such a proposal under current circumstances. These political parties are not the kind that participate "on their own." They only answer "when a question is asked." Unfortunately, it is too much of a "bother" for the majority of today's political parties to act on their own, debate or add to the body of thought. Is not reticence already partly at the bottom of the political vacuum? Vis-a-vis the CWP's recent proposal, we reiterate the "must" which we cited above.

It is CWP General Chairman Husamettin Cindoruk who is father to the proposal, and we felt that we should learn his thoughts on it.

Our conversation with CWP General Chairman Cindoruk follows:

[Question] Mr Cindoruk, you -- the Correct Way Party -- made a remarkable proposal recently, presenting Turkey with a new political agenda. Where did such a proposal as this come from?

[Answer] We have said that our nation has been unable to prepare for self-regulating institutions. We have said that there are countless advantages in having self-regulating institutions and they need to be established by the nation. We expressed our ideas on this when the Consultative Assembly was formed. Naturally, we could not exert any influence in this matter. In my opinion, the first crisis in Turkey is a constitutional crisis. The Turkish founding constitution, the 1924 constitution, was consistent within itself; it was a new and austere constitution. Our republic took its character from that constitution. As a lawyer, I do not favor having too many details in the constitution, as the supreme law. It may be better for Turkey to write a law which sets forth general rules. In fact, the 1924 constitution was able to spawn both the multi-party era and democracy.

[Question] How could this proposal of yours be put into practice? How should a Constitutional Convention be convened?

[Answer] It has been done twice. There were the post-war instances on the European continent. And later in Italy and Germany. There can be two kinds of constitutional convention. First, a constitutional convention may be called for a purely constitutional ideal. Thought may be given to a constitutional convention for which the political parties would field candidates and openly express their ideas on the constitution. Second, it is possible to call a new constitutional convention to assume the task of formulating a democratic structure. If Turkey does not want to hold two elections or finds two elections objectionable, this would be the way to go. In the next elections, the political parties would make public their views on economic, social and constitutional change. When an interparty consensus was obtained on the writing of a new constitution, the nation would know that it would be a new constitution along the lines of the votes they had cast.

[Question] What kind of political timetable would this require?

[Answer] Turkey has an important obligation to hold such an election during 1986. Turkey is always in turmoil because it has been unable to formulate a consistent structure as regards regime. I am saying openly, because I said the same things at the Yassıada trials in 1960, that the 1960 revolution was definitely a turning point in the Turkish Republic. At bottom, the 1960 revolution was the debut of the national will. The 1961 constitution unveiled the national will. The 1961 constitution was a throwback in state structure in the Turkish-Ottoman synthesis. It was to return the sovereignty of the civilian-military bureaucracy to the governing of the state. The people have been sharing their sovereignty with the civilian-military bureaucracy. There are examples of this. It came of age with bodies such as the National Security Council, the powerful Constitutional Court, the independent (or "autonomous" as we call it) university, the radio and television administration and the Senate. In fact, after 1961, our social, legal and even economic structure was determined by this separation of powers. Sadly, the framers of the 1961 constitution have perceived the results produced by that constitution in Turkey as the root of the 1980 takeover. It is clear that a lawmaking organization based on the assembly-senate-constitution triumvirate will work slowly. The

results and disadvantages of this slowness became a burden upon the national will, democracy, the parliament and politics in 1980. For the 21st century, Turkey must build a state which mutually accepts the supremacy of the law but in which the national will is quickly reflected structurally upon the legislature and social events and which can perform quickly. Within this structure, the principle of separation of powers and supremacy of the national will must be closely guarded.

[Question] The political formula that you are proposing in order to realize these principles, the constitutional convention-new constitution-elections formula, would have to be accepted by the political parties which presently figure in the decision-making mechanism and not least by the Assembly. Do you think this is likely?

[Answer] The constitution is a document of national consensus. From the preamble to the conclusion, it is hard to believe that the present constitution is a document of national consensus. This constitution is a committee constitution. It is a constitution conceived, written and placed in effect by the takeover power. The referendum was only a formality. The underlying will was the will of the National Security Council. It cannot produce national consensus. It is not a national directive, either. It is an instrument which projects the Republic of Turkey as a military republic. I am using military republic as a legal term. The preamble to this constitution contains the principle that the takeover army may intervene in the structure of the state and dissolve parliament. The Consultative Assembly appears in the preamble of this constitution as the legitimate representative of the people. This constitution is the apology, rationale and line of defense of the takeover. A national consensus cannot emerge from this constitution. In fact, it is impossible for all democratic parties to reach a consensus with this constitution.

[Question] How, in your opinion, could the present political parties accept your proposal since the present parliament is a product of the constitution?

[Answer] It is necessary for the parties to unite in the appraisal that this constitution is not conducive to democracy in the formation of new political parties.

[Question] Since the constitution represents a national consensus, is the present parliament not also a part of this consensus according to your definition?

[Answer] I have no hope for this parliament.

[Question] Then what do you think about its validity?

[Answer] We think it is necessary to find a solution from the bottom up. Political parties which think as we do must campaign for a new constitutional formula in the new elections. If the nation seats a parliament from among the parties which bring this new constitutional formula to the nation, it will

be of the same mind as that parliament. I am not saying here, "Let it be the constitution that I want." But I hope that the notion, or consensus, would emerge for a constitutional convention composed of parties representing various political ideas.

[Question] That is, the parliament that would result from the elections would assume the task of a constitutional convention in a sense, is that correct?

[Answer] It has to. This is a formula on which consensus is easy. It is possible for us to return to civilian democracy, a civilian republic within the framework of this formula.

[Question] The first task of the newly elected parliament, then, is to write a new constitution.

[Answer] I am not saying that it should neglect the progress of the state and the republic or the governing of the country so as to assume the task of a new constitution. If, in fact, the democratic left and right are represented in that parliament, a national consensus can even be reached on the matter of government.

[Question] You keep using the term national consensus for this. Would you go so far as actual cooperation with other parties in this regard?

[Answer] We are ready to begin preparations in this regard with all like-minded political parties. The CWP is not asking for a constitution after its own heart. The 1961 constitution turned the RPP's 1957 declaration of its primary goals into a constitution. It did not stick; it was a one-sided constitution. The representation of the RPP and the lack of representation of other parties [in] the constitutional convention produced a lopsided constitution. There was no consensus there, only constraint. The 1982 constitution, meanwhile, bans politics. Members of the Consultative Assembly were prohibited from being political party members. This is a professional view, that it is totally the constitution of the takeover council.

[Question] Suppose the parliament that would be formed after elections wrote a new constitution. A national consensus was formed around this constitution. In writing a new constitution, would it have produced a document that would prevent military interventions in the future?

[Answer] Definitely. The present constitution applies the formula of the people at the service of the state. Our constitution of consensus will have the state at the service of the people. This constitution will specify that parliament cannot be dissolved and that the attributes of the republic cannot be changed. It will be written in the new constitution that legislative immunity cannot be lifted. The National Security Council will not appear in the new constitution. The new constitution, if you ask me, ought to introduce formulas or clauses to regulate or prevent any national administration other than a constitutional court which performs the function of senate. The point is, Turkey has had a parliament for 110 years. Unfortunately, the Turkish

parliament has been dissolved once by the sultan, once by occupying forces and twice by takeovers. The rationales for all the dissolutions were similar, only the dissolvers were different, but those who deplored the sultan's bringing in occupying troops to dissolve one state's parliament, who labeled the sultan the Red Sultan or considered the occupying forces enemies, subsequently applauded the dissolutions of parliament.

[Question] You are firmly opposed to military intervention. But would writing the rules you have indicated into the constitution prevent military interventions, I wonder? Regardless of how many such rules appear in the constitution, takeovers are carried out by force of arms. How will this intervention be prevented?

[Answer] It is impossible in this day and age to prevent an army from conducting an overthrow. Formerly, kings and even the church prevented army takeovers by forming a guard. But, if you put a whole corps around Cankaya to protect it against what could be done with conventional arms, the army could still take over if it decided to. The advanced Western nations have only one force preventing takeovers: the resolve and resistance of the people. It is moral -- the takeover deterrent, and the takeover justification -- not material. This constitution of consensus would produce a national resolve. I am saying that, to date, takeovers have been against the people and also, to me, cancel out the constitutional referendums and the votes cast by the people. Some say they get their authority from the constitution, others from the Internal Service Law. All of these legal bases must be eliminated. I feel for the first time that the constitution was violated by regulations and laws. Turkey feels it. This constitution must at least bring some clarity to them. The preamble of this constitution must start with the National Independence Army. It must talk about democracy. It must speak of the national will. It must state that no one may revolt against this will and that solutions will be sought by democratic means. We are feeling the lack of such a document to date. I believe that the Turkish army loves democracy. Turkey must have a constitutional text that specifically binds it to a democratic order. This must be done. This framework must be provided and must provide within the framework of the constitution for our army's position within the national supremacy. This document is lacking. Despite the lack of this document, the people resist those who would conduct takeovers. Then national resistance is in place. The revolutionaries are ready for the counter revolution.

[Question] I think this proposal of yours will be debated widely in days to come.

[Answer] This is something vital. The Turkish intellectual is striving to grasp the importance of this phenomenon. The strangest thing I have experienced in the past 25 years is that professors who signed documents testifying to the illegitimacy of the Democratic Party in 1960 are writing articles against me now. They are professors of law, the constitution and government. Turkey will overcome this scholarly class. It is a continuation of the medrese [elite Muslim schools from which officials were usually drawn] in Turkey. Allowing the medrese and the barracks to go beyond the national will must be prevented. There is no other way.

POLITICAL

TURKEY

SOVIET FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS HEAD TO VISIT TO TURKEY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 6 Jan 86 pp 1, 9

[Article by Sami Kohen on return from Moscow: "Warm Relations"]

[Text] --Natural gas pipeline project to be taken up in talks. Turkey wants Russians to buy as much in imports as they sell in natural gas.

--The new year saw a "Turkish tourism boom" to USSR. Soviet authorities are happy to see this many Turks, even all at once.

--Growth in Turkish-USSR trade accompanies success in putting new Turkish products on Soviet market in 1985.

The Soviet Union's new State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations Chairman Katushev is expected to come to Ankara at the end of the month for the Turkish-Soviet Joint Economic Commission talks.

This cabinet-level official, charged with conducting the USSR's foreign economic relations, will make the focal point of his contacts in Ankara the work on the Natural Gas Pipeline Project. The Joint Economic Commission (JEC) was actually supposed to have met in Ankara last November. However, the talks were postponed at Moscow's request when Mikhail Sergeychik, the official who would have headed the Soviet delegation, was removed from his post.

Preparations have been completed for the talks to be held in Ankara at the end of this month, and the delegation will be headed by Katushev, newly appointed to administer foreign economic relations.

The natural gas pipeline to run from the Soviet Union to Turkey is supposed to be operational by the first of next year according to the agreement. The agreement calls for Turkey to purchase 1.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas in the initial phase. This amount is to increase starting in 1989 and reach 6 billion cubic meters in 1990.

Some snags over the form of payment have developed in recent weeks between the two sides in technical-level endeavors. Turkey wants the Soviets to buy as many Turkish goods as the value of the natural gas that would be purchased. That is, the Turkish side is proposing a kind of exchange system. The Soviets, however, are asking for "cash" in equivalent foreign exchange outside of the goods they import.

Even though the Soviets have seemed willing to buy more goods from Turkey in recent contacts, they are obviously avoiding any commitment in this regard at the present. The main problem involves practical points such as whether Turkey will in fact be able to sell goods of the type to meet the Soviet Union's needs in years to come and whether the prices it will ask for these goods will be competitive with world market prices. Even though it is important for the Soviets to make commitments now in this regard, realization of them in the future will still depend on the USSR's needs and the ability of Turkish goods to penetrate this market.

The cabinet-level talks in Ankara are expected to produce agreement.

Market for Turkey

Meanwhile, the development in Turkish-Soviet trade in 1985 allows hope for the future. The trade volume between the two countries last year was \$450 million. Although this is well below the goal of \$600 million, the important thing for Turkey is that there was an import-export balance and Turkish products from leather goods to razors were able to be sold to the Soviet Union for the first time. Soviet leader Gorbachev's policy of developing and opening up the Soviet economy will make it possible for Turkey to increase and diversify its exports to this country, it is hoped.

Prime Minister Ozal's anticipated visit to Moscow will also add impetus to the development of trade and economic relations. The date of this trip has not been set, but it will probably take place in the spring.

The latest development in increased contacts in various areas with the Soviets is the interest shown in this country by Turkish tourists at the first of the year.

More than 700 Turks joined tours to Russia arranged by various travel agencies. The most Turkish tourists went to the Soviet Union for New Year's. The most important reasons for this choice are the low cost of the trip and its cultural and arts-related attractions.

Officials at "Intourist," the state-run agency that organizes all tours in the USSR, were, of course, surprised and delighted by this "Turkish tourist boom."

Turkey in Soviet Press

Two articles about Turkey appeared in the Soviet press during the week. PRAVDA on New Year's Eve published a magazine-type article about the life of Father Christmas in Turkey. A monthly journal named NEW TIMES, published in

various foreign languages, carried an article on the Eastern Mediterranean Security seminar held recently at Tarabya and offered the interpretation that the West was inciting Turkey against the Soviets. The article said that, despite the curtailment of freedoms in Turkey, voices had been raised against the U.S. military presence and many Turks were opposed to Washington's desire to "establish hegemony." A cartoon accompanying the article showed the United States stirring up Turkey against the Soviet threat.

Meanwhile, the Soviet press is avoiding any publication about the situation of the Turks in Bulgaria. Moscow's official position is that this is an internal problem of Bulgaria's. However, it seems to be an embarrassment for Soviet diplomats, and the press, never mind expressing its views, is totally ignoring the subject, including Bulgaria's claims about it.

8349

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POLITICAL

TURKEY

BULGARIA WANTS TO RAISE PRICE OF ELECTRICITY, SOVIET PRICE STEADY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 6 Jan 85 pp 1, 9

[Article by Zulfikar Dogan: "We Said 'No' to Bulgarian Price Hike"]

[Text] Ankara - Talks between Turkish Electric Power Corporation [TEK] and Bulgarian officials on renewal of the electricity contract ended in "dis-agreement." It was decided that another meeting would be held in March.

According to information given by TEK officials, Bulgaria wanted to raise the price, currently 17 pfennigs (40.46 liras) per kilowatt hour, by 10 percent. The TEK told the Bulgarian officials that "electricity will be purchased if the contract is extended for 1 year at the same price, otherwise the agreement will be discontinued." Officials said the Bulgarian side asked for time when the price hike request was not accepted and it was decided to meet again in March.

"All Right If We Don't But"

One official who attended the Turkish-Bulgarian electricity contract talks said that "Bulgaria is badly in need of foreign exchange and wanted to raise the price of electricity for this reason." "Our cost is 20 liras and our average charge is a mere 33 liras. We are buying electricity at a higher price than this because we have an agreement with Bulgaria. But we will not pay the price hike they are asking. If necessary and if they do not agree to sell at the old price, the agreement cannot be renewed. We are self-sufficient in electricity at the moment," he said.

Turkey buys 1.2 billion kilowatt hours of electricity a year from Bulgaria. Electricity is continuing to be transmitted even though the talks were severed, according to officials. Depending on the outcome of the talks in March, electricity will continue to be purchased at the same price or it will be cut off if agreement cannot be reached.

Meanwhile, agreement was reached to continue the purchase of electricity from the Soviet Union at the same price following the trip to Moscow by a delegation headed by TEK Deputy General Director Muhittin Babalioglu. The fixed price according to the electricity agreement with the Soviets is 2 cents (12 liras) per kilowatt hour. Prices may be renegotiated if there is an

extraordinary rise in oil prices according to the agreement. However, there is reportedly no question of such a possibility at the present time when oil prices are steadily falling.

The final protocol on the agreement to retain the former price will, therefore, be completed this month and signed during the Turkish-Soviet Joint Economic Commission meeting. We are buying 700 million kilowatt hours of electricity from the Soviet Union annually.

8349
3554/28

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

UNIFIED EUROPEAN DEFENSE STRATEGY ADVOCATED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 6 Jan 86 p 5

[Article by Pierre Darcourt: "Single Strategy for European Theater"]

[Text] Military doctrines evolve but fundamental factors influencing the art of warfare remain constant: identification of the enemy, definition of the mission, assessment of resources and capabilities, and for the battle per se, terrain, surprise, and maneuver. Today's debates on defense, the economy, and political solidarity all center on Europe.

The three-circle theory recently set forth by the socialist government does not withstand serious examination. This theory can be summarized as follows: the first circle is the national sanctuary, the second the defense of Western Europe, the third the protection of our overseas territories and supply lines. But the European theater is a single theater. There is no strategic discontinuity between this side and the far side of the Rhine.

Given the formidable power and size of the forces available to the Soviets in a major conflict, allied and French forces would have to engage the Soviet forces on a single unified front. There would not be two battles, only one. The primary Soviet objective would not be to establish a bridgehead on the Elbe but to go all-out, break through, and establish a bridgehead on the Rhine. Trying to carve the battle "into slices" is patently absurd. This battle will be won or lost, but we shall not be able to afford the luxury of fighting a second one by ourselves alone.

What Mission for Hades?

French-German "cohesiveness" will continue to be an illusion if we do not take the risk of filling and holding a forward "slot" on the eastern border instead of positioning ourselves rearward in a second line of defense. No progress will be made in the European defense system as long as this problem is not settled. Reinforcing the Rapid Action Force (FAR) to have it venture into a hostile environment marked by extremely heavy enemy fire would be a dangerous illusion. Regrouping Hades [new-generation mobile tactical nuclear surface-to-surface missile] fire units into a reserve force for a second battle that will not take place would solve nothing.

The new conception of the Hades system raises a fundamental question. Exactly what are tactical nuclear weapons? They are battlefield weapons. He who has them and takes the risk of using them brings things to a head. He who has no such weapons is overwhelmed. In that case, what then does the new term "prestrategic weapons" mean?

Up until 1981, our nuclear doctrine linked the use of tactical weapons to a limited warning and included in its evolution the development and deployment of neutron weapons with a larger number of warheads. Military leaders did their utmost to tone down the linkage between tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons.

Since 1981, the socialist government has moved in the opposite direction. It has strengthened the final warning concept, thereby moving into that inevitable sequence culminating in a sweeping response by our strategic nuclear strike force. The enemy, superior in manpower and materiel, would pull out all the stops within a well-defined limited area. The immediate use of our tactical nuclear weapons upon large troop concentrations would be one way of reestablishing a certain balance.

Forward area deterrence can be effective only by direct and rapid intervention. How could we possibly participate in the action belatedly and advance through a large devastated area with bridges and roads damaged or jammed with streams of refugees and chaotically withdrawing troops?

We would have no depth, no room. We would very quickly have our backs to the sea. Conversely, the Soviets have immense expanses. General de Gaulle once succinctly described our situation with the following quip: "The distance between Czechoslovakia and the Atlantic is two laps in the Tour de France [bicycle road race]."

Rejection of Strategic Defense Initiative

The Hades missile's greater range--350 to 400 kilometers--is not decisive. Should this missile be employed against second-echelon forces? Against airfields? Against depots? Attacking such targets is the job of aircraft. The latter are more accurate and designed for these missions. Surface-to-surface tactical nuclear weapons are fit for use within the fringe contact area--30 to 40 kilometers--against detected and continuously observed targets. These weapons have an important role in the European theater and should--why not?--be placed under a "dual-key" system for joint French-German control of their use, like the U.S.-FRG system governing use of U.S. weapons deployed in the FRG. On the other hand, our strategic weapons cannot and must not be integrated in Europe. They must remain under France's sole control. They are France's last resort and not a last warning. Conventional forces and their tactical nuclear weapons must probe the enemy's real intentions and stop him with a brief and violent strike.

Actually, implementation of nuclear strategy brings three nations into play. There is no real correlation of forces between France and the USSR. But we are not alone. When we shall have 300 to 400 nuclear warheads, our threat to use them will become more credible. The Soviets, who are excellent chess

players, will then take our threat seriously, because the United States would immediately exploit this momentary position of weakness. And Moscow would be more preoccupied with the enormous U.S. threat than with vitrifying France in a nuclear strike.

In fact, the United States and the USSR spend their time discussing and negotiating in an effort to attain approximate parity and thus avoid having either party placed in a position of weakness. The current French theory of "deterrence of a strong nuclear power by a weak nuclear power" is absurd. It means that we are acting as if the American forces and the guarantee they constitute did not exist.

As for our government's negative attitude toward the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)--an attitude which consists in offhandedly dismissing the Soviet threat and its extraordinary build-up in space--it is an affront to our allies and may well force us ultimately into an unacceptable position of technological and scientific backwardness.

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MILITARY

BELGIUM

FIRST TRIPARTITE MINEHUNTER/SWEEPER ENTERS SERVICE

Brussels LE SOIR in French 19 Dec 85 p 8

[Article: "First New-Generation Minehunter, 'Aster', Christened in Ostend"]

[Text] Princess Paola christened the first of the Belgian Navy's 10 new minehunters Monday at the Mercantile-Beliard shipyard in Ostend.

Several dignitaries were present at the ceremony, including National Defense Minister Francois-Xavier De Donnea, Public Works Minister Louis Olivier, Middle Classes Minister Jacky Buchmann, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Gijsemberg, and Naval Chief of Staff Vice Admiral A. Schlim. Also in attendance were Governor Vanneste of the province of West Flanders and Burgomaster W. Content of Blankenberge, the city sponsoring the ship.

After christening the ship "Aster," Princess Paola, as tradition demands, broke a bottle of champagne across its bow. She then made a short visit aboard the ship, during which the ship's officers and several members of the crew were presented to her.

All-Polyester Hull

The M-915 "Aster" is a new-generation minehunter. Its hull is built entirely of polyester reinforced plastics. It is the first of a series of 10 Belgian minehunters built under the tripartite--Belgian, Dutch, French--program.

The other nine ships are to be delivered to the Belgian Navy at 6-month intervals. This minehunter, incorporating highly advanced technologies, is also a sort of showcase for the know-how of several Belgian, French, and Dutch industries. Belgium's share of this tripartite program amounts to some 25 percent of the total contract signed by the three countries and calling for construction of some 40 ships. Several Belgian industrial firms--Mercantile-Beliard and ACEC [Charleroi Electrical Engineering Shops], among them--are participating in the program.

This new tripartite minehunter has an overall length of 47.1 meters, a beam of 8.9 meters, a draught of 2.45 meters, and a complement of 49 men. Its major items of equipment include a detection sonar, a classification sonar, two wire-guided unmanned submersibles armed with mine-destruction charges, lightweight

mechanical sweeping gear with its winch, a 20-millimeter gun for destruction of floating mines, and appropriate equipment for the ship's team of divers.

Minehunting has several advantages over minesweeping. Among other things, it makes it possible to: relieve mine warfare forces of the tedious task of having to cover a high number of times those channels deemed dangerous because of mines; hunt down mines that are nonsweepable or difficult to sweep because of the complexity of their ignition circuits; operate at a safe distance from a mine; reroute ships along controlled lanes through a mined area; and lastly, recover mines for the purpose of examining them. Equally noteworthy is the fact that minehunters can be used in peacetime to survey the seabed and also search for equipment and goods lost at sea.

Tripartite Cooperation

In his brief remarks made at the Mercantile-Beliard shipyard, Defense Minister de Donnea recalled that the tripartite cooperation agreement had been signed on 15 March 1975. He added that the agreement covered research, development, construction, testing, technical and operational evaluation, and logistic support of this new type of minehunter. The minister explained that under this agreement, the three contractual countries undertook each to build its own hulls and fit them with propulsion systems, armament, and also standardized machinery and equipment common to the three navies concerned. Minister de Donnea said that this high technology program had been made possible by the cooperation of the three countries.

According to the minister, the minehunters "Bellis" and "Crocus" will follow "Aster" in being officially turned over to the Belgian Navy. This program, he said, employed some 100 highly skilled technical personnel and had also created approximately 300 new jobs in Ostend and Rupelmonde.

8041

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MILITARY

FRANCE

MANPOWER REDUCTIONS FORESEEN IN NAVY

Brest OUEST-FRANCE in French 26 Dec 85 p 199

[Article by Christian Cressard]

[Text] Manpower reductions in the Navy, envisaged in the 1984-88 planning law and expected to affect a total of 3,500 men over the five years, will be continued in 1986 and will affect 700 people, i.e., 30 officers, 140 petty officers and 530 enlisted men.

Thus, the manpower provided for in the budget, which totaled 67,711 in 1984 and 67,040 in 1985, will total 66,345 in 1986. This decrease is all the more fraught with problems because the Navy states that it would need 5,000 more men to cope with the constraints of military life and carry out its missions. To be sure, the decrease in the number of combat ships, which went from 183 in 1978 down to 145 at present, facilitates the decline to a degree. The present number of ships should not begin to increase again until 1991, after the scrapping of some 20 mine destroyers, which will be replaced in part.

But this parallel decline in combat ships and crews, regrettable as it may be, does not resolve all the problems caused by manpower reductions.

The two most important problems are insufficient staffing of cadres as the result of a shortage of officers, estimated as at least 300, and slow promotions, especially for leading seamen and petty officers.

Paradoxically, in order to resolve the problem of understaffing of cadres, it will be necessary, while decreasing the number of officers by 30 in accordance with the manpower reduction plan, in 1986 to create 20 new naval aviation pilot-officer positions for the benefit of petty officers and to release 30 other officer positions for the "restructuring of authorized manpower without effect on the budget."

By means of what clever arithmetic the personnel office will resolve this problem is not apparent from the 1986 Navy budget. But, if this document is to be given credence, there will be a total of 4,473 officers, as opposed to 4,458 in 1985, or an increase of 15.

On the other hand, nothing can prevent the average time in grade of ranking leading seamen from going from 2 years and 6 months in 1983 to 3 years and 7 months in 1985 or from continuing to go up.

Despite the elimination of 140 positions, the number of petty officers should go up from 28,951 to 29,346. Insofar as enlisted men are concerned, manpower reductions--which do not effect female personnel--will be borne essentially by volunteers. These involve 530 positions.

The number of long-term volunteers inducted, which increased from fewer than 500 in October 1983 to 4,157 in October 1985, should remain at the latter level.

These factors being taken into account, the Navy budget will provide for 4,473 officers, 29,346 petty officers, 13,957 volunteers and 18,569 conscripts. Women will number 1,520, of which 850 are petty officers.

Wages and fringe benefits for all personnel will represent a sum of 7.396 billion, i.e., an increase of 4.3 percent as compared with 1985.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

5 NAVY SQUADRONS AT FULL STRENGTH

Brest OUEST-FRANCE in French 27 Dec 85 p 199

[Article by R. Cosqueric]

[Text] The arrival of the last gunboat of the A-69 series will be Brest's first Navy "event" of 1986. The Commandant L'Herminier not only concludes a very successful series; it is also, from the standpoint of propulsion, a prototype foreshadowing Brest's antiaircraft corvettes on the Cassard class.

Thirteen years after the keel-laying of the prototype Estienne d'Orves the Navy men who sail it are as enthusiastic as ever.

In 1986, five squadrons will be at full strength: one at Cherbourg, two at Brest, and two at Toulon.

"During our recent exercises in northern Scotland, the English were impressed by the quantity of arms and equipment that a ship as small as our Detroyat can carry," reports Commander Wybo, commander of the 2d gunboat squadron.

"We were the only French ship in a force of 35 from 10 different nations. Our gunboat, which was recently modernized, could stand comparison with ships of greater tonnage."

Economical...

In the nine years since they entered into service, the gunboats have become famous: Spanish fishermen will not soon forget the LV Lavallee, and even in the strait of Hormuz these 1,200-ton ships are beginning to be known. And they are being used farther and farther away from their bases: the Commandant Blaison has left for a 2 year cruise in the Pacific. It is the kind of mission that was not foreseen at the time the series was launched.

Budgetary restrictions on personnel and fuel are not unrelated to these experiences: in a month and a half, the Detroyat consumed the equivalent of the fuel that a fleet escort ship would need for 4 days of operations. Since the series was launched, moreover, new improvements have been effected: after the oldest one have been refitted, all the gunboats will have the new engine arrangement in which the drive shafts are disconnected thus saving fuel and facilitating the cleaning of the engines.

And hard-working

Originally envisaged as carrying six ASW rocket-launchers and a 10 mm gun, the gunboats have little by little become fully equipped war machines with Exocet 38 anti-ship missiles (and even in some cases Exocet 40 anti-ship missiles with an over-the-horizon capability) and a whole range of electronic warfare equipment.

The 100 mm guns have had their rate of fire increased from 60 to 80 or 90 shots a minute. The Vega II fire control equipment is the best in the Navy, except for that of the corvettes.

"A ship like the Commandant Birot which entered into service in 1984, was one of the first to be equipped with stabilizers. Though well equipped for ASW (especially at shallow depths), anti-ship and anti-aircraft operations, it cannot, or course, compete with larger ships," declares Commander Rolet, commander of the 4th gunboat squadron and of the Birot. It lacks helicopters, Malafons, Tartars, towed sonar, etc. But it is a very versatile ship, capable of doing good work both on its own and in cooperation with other ships or naval aviation.

And it has an additional advantage: at present, a squadron of three or four gunboats costs no more to build than a single new corvette. It is understandable therefore that the Navy proposes to provide the fleet with a good number (17) of them before beginning the construction of nuclear attack submarines and large new surface ships.

The squadrons at Brest have four ships each, whereas those in other ports have only three.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

MATERIEL SHORTAGES REPORTED BY ARMY

Paris LE FIGARO in French 30 Dec 85 p 5

[Article by Pierre Darcourt: "Materiel Shortages Plague Army"]

[Text] The Rapid Action [Redeployment] Force (FAR) is a heterogeneous command comprising five basically different divisions, namely airborne, amphibious, airmobile, light armored, and mountain. This avowedly "multipurpose" force is, in point of fact, in a position to intervene in overseas theaters of operations.

But the FAR will not have received all its authorized air defense missiles until 1990, all its forward-area armored vehicles (VAB), armed with HOT antitank missiles, until 1987, all its Sagaie wheeled light armored cars until 1989, and all its towed 155-millimeter guns until a date as yet unknown. Consequently, in the European theater the FAR will by no means be able to relieve the First Army's main battle force (called the mechanized armored corps). The First Army, with its 160,000 men and 1,300 AMX-30 main battle tanks, is currently the French Army's spearhead force (10 divisions, including two divisions made up of service school staff, faculty, and troops).

Despite the attachment of divisions to the First Army in an effort to mask a continuous reduction in force, the major cuts in army manpower show that the period of "large battalions", an expression of old, is definitely over. During World War I, France deployed no less than 93 divisions on the Eastern and Northern fronts. Since then, our weapons have improved and become more powerful and effective, but so have those of our adversaries.

The military manpower mobilized in 1985 was but 15 percent of the manpower mobilized during World War I when our population was 40 million!

The Soviets maintain a force of more than 100,000 armored vehicles. This seems to prove that, in the Soviet view, expecting armored warfare does not mean being "one war behind".

The obsolescence of France's tank inventory is a source of great anxiety at a time when only about one-fourth of the AMX-30 tanks have been converted into the modernized AMX-30B2 version. Even more alarming is the fact that 5 years from now, when the first of the future main battle tanks is expected to be

delivered, only half of the French tank inventory will consist of AMX-30B2 tanks, with the other half being old AMX-30's. Providing things go as planned, by the year 2000, only 60 percent of French Army tanks will be the highly touted future tank and 40 percent the AMX-30B2. Knowing that our adversaries will have their heart set on modernizing their armored vehicles, we can legitimately ask who is preparing to refight World War II. Is France's present socialist government giving the armed forces sufficient means with which to implement its directives and defense policy? New types of equipment recognized as brilliant technical achievements are still being allocated in dribs and drabs. For instance: only five or six of our existing 25 artillery regiments have received the self-propelled rapid-fire 155-millimeter gun; all artillery regiments still have to rely on old World War II-vintage halftracks for their anti-aircraft defense; regiments of the DIMA [Marine Infantry Division] and the airborne division still have World War II-vintage GMC [General Motors 2½-ton] trucks; some motorized regiments are still transported on 40-year old 4 X 4 Dodges [¾-ton trucks], and continue to await receipt of their authorized VAB's; and some reserve regiments are equipped with museum pieces.

One of the current major problems continues to be air defense weapons for units not stationed in eastern France where Hawk and Roland missiles provide proper protection. At the present time, these units have absolutely no air defense weapons and would, therefore, be unable to counter any air attacks. Because of this, their redeployment to the front in eastern France would very likely be a risky move. No doubt the Matra light SATCP [surface-to-air very short range] missile will solve this problem because it is apparently a highly effective weapon. But only a total of 300 have been ordered from 1986 to 1988, and these will be delivered in 3 or 4 years.

The complete list of all obsolescent materiel, obscured by the outstanding materiel being issued in driblets, would be lengthy. This list is indicative of the disquieting lag which has occurred since 1981. Sound management of our defense resources has been replaced by rhetoric and abstruse concepts coupled with budgetary contrivances designed to cover up the shortage of resources due to deplorable management in 1981 and 1982.

Officers and NCO's, who are competent, are hard put to cope with this materiel shortage that precludes their conducting field exercises with their organic weapons more than 40 days per year (100, but without artillerymen always having their cannon, and tankers their tanks).

Concern is greatest within the army's regiments. The army does not have the same patent indicators of shortages as the air force has with its minimum number of aircraft, or the navy has with its tonnage. A number of tanks, cannon, or radio sets is more difficult to evaluate, and it is always less conspicuous to reduce personnel than the number of aircraft or ships.

The army is composed mainly of draftees: 190,000 compared with 50,000 in the navy and air force combined. Hence the impact of current restrictions is greatest on the army. As a result, the army could in the future have difficulty accomplishing its assigned deterrence-related missions.

Many officers and NCO's have already warned the military high command and the socialist government leadership. But being duty-bound to exercise caution in their speech and conduct, these officers and NCO's have not flaunted their words of warning in public. However, some general officers mentioned by name by the present government in cabinet meetings thought they ought to make some of their warnings public, undoubtedly in the belief that beyond a certain point it would be unpardonable for them to remain silent.

In the interests of France's defense, we hope that our leaders will not be politically color-blind for too long. The credibility of our deterrent hinges thereon.

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MILITARY

NORWAY

NATO ALLIES SAID DISTURBED OVER AIR DEFENSE, PILOT DRAIN

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Jan 86 p 9

[Article by Olav Trygge Storvik: "Allied Anxiety Over Norwegian Air Defense"]

[Text] There is anxiety in central allied quarters over the crisis in Norwegian air defense. At the same time the shortage of competent pilots, leaders and technicians in the air force is greater than has been experienced up to now, AFTENPOSTEN has learned.

The question is also being raised of whether the service branch is able to accomplish the tasks which have been assigned by political authorities, such as the situation is today.

It is emphasized to AFTENPOSTEN from central allied quarters that there is reason for anxiety concerning the state of affairs in the Norwegian air force when four out of five fighter plane squadrons are not able to meet the requirements for "operational status." It is being said that this anxiety also concerns the future, since, seen from outside it seems that the political system in Norway is not able to find a solution to the problem in spite of the fact that it has been so obvious for many years. To the question of whether confidence and credibility with respect to Norway's defense policy in an alliance context are in the process of being undermined because of the personnel crisis, the sources stress that this is to go too far at the present time.

Creating Stir

But there is little doubt that the situation in the Norwegian air force is now being followed with keener attention internationally. An expression of this is the fact that the American AIR FORCE MAGAZINE in its last issue has a commentary on the Norwegian fighter plane arm. Also, the well reputed British JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY periodical has begun to study the situation more closely.

From what AFTENPOSTEN has reason to believe, the shortage of competent specialists in the air force is greater than has been known up to now. Today there is not a single Norwegian fighter pilot who is competent to be promoted to squadron commander. In many squadrons there are also far more planes than

pilots, whereas the situation should be vice-versa according to the NATO standard.

Norwegian Supervision

The problem is that SAS and Braathens have recently recruited older pilots with long experience, so that the armed forces have not been able to sustain the leadership apparatus with squadron commanders, seconds-in-command and wing commanders. The leadership apparatus at air stations and other staffs are being injured, besides. Both the supreme commander of South Norway, Lieutenant General Eyvind Schibbye, and Air Force Inspector General Olav F. Aamo have pointed out previously that the shortage of leaders can come to shake a central principle in Norway's security policy, which is to the effect that all allied forces which are transferred to Norway must be subjected to Norwegian supervision. General Schibbye, who has operational responsibility in South Norway, has expressed it as follows:

"Without a continuous supply from below of all categories of air force expertise for operational staff units, there is obviously a limit to what we can as a nation demand of 'subordination' on the part of our allies."

It can hardly be said more clearly. It is important to procure officers who are able to make decisions with major consequences, both operationally and for flight safety. Several allied air squadrons are transported to Norway for exercises annually. In a crisis and war, according to the plans, it can be a question of transferring several hundred allied planes to Norway, first and foremost American. Is it reasonable that these be subjected to the leadership and supervision of Norwegian officers when they lack experience and competence? Here it is obviously a question of a confidence and credibility situation in NATO, as well as of making Norway's security policy credible with respect to the Soviet Union. These are factors which are difficult to measure, but from what AFTENPOSTEN has reason to believe, signals have come from allied air force quarters which indicate skepticism regarding the situation in the Norwegian air force.

The public's attention has been directed mainly toward the fighter plane arm, but the personnel crisis is more extensive than this. It is well known that 400 technical positions remain unfilled, and there is reason to believe that both the helicopter squadrons and the 333rd and 335th squadrons have experienced the pilot drain. The 333rd Squadron performs important transport duties, and the 335th Squadron is outfitted with "Orion" naval reconnaissance planes which keep an eye on Soviet activity both above and below the surface of the ocean in the Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea. The squadron constitutes a very important element of the surveillance and warning apparatus in the world's perhaps most strategic region.

8831

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MILITARY

NORWAY

POLL FINDS CONTINUED STRONG SUPPORT FOR NATO

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Jan 86 p 20

[Article: "Two Out of Three Norwegians for NATO"]

[Text] A poll which was taken for FOLK OG FORSVAR [PEOPLE AND DEFENSE] in November 1985 shows that there is still very great support for Norwegian membership in NATO. Sixty-five percent answer that membership insures peace, and this is the next highest figure recorded since the polls began in 1966.

The percentage who warn that NATO membership increases the danger of attack has declined from 10 to 6 percent from 1984 to 1985, and the "Do Not Know" group has increased from 12 to 19 percent. The figure for support among men has declined from 75 percent in 1984 to 71 in 1985, whereas among women the figure has increased from 58 to 60 percent.

8831

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MILITARY

NORWAY

BRIEFS

CONTRACT FOR ARMORED TURRETS--The Lier Thune-Eureka firm of the Kvaerner concern has received an additional contract for armored protective turrets for the Norwegian armed forces. The turret is to be used on the M-113 personnel transport vehicle (PPK) for launching the TOW wire-guided antitank missile. The contract has a value of 36 million kroner. Development of the turret has taken six years, but nevertheless this can be regarded as a relatively short time, when the extensive assignment the firm received is taken into consideration, the director of the Lier firm, Olav Solberg, states.
[Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Jan 86 p 45] 8831

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MILITARY

PORTUGAL

LEMONS FERREIRA ON 'ORION P3' PLANE USE

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 13 Dec 85 p 2

[Text] In an interview which appeared yesterday in Ponta Delgada, Lemos Ferreira said that the nation's mission and the NATO mission are not choices between alternatives, but rather converging issues."

The Armed Forces chief of staff was on the Azores islands of Sao Miguel and Terceira at the beginning of the week, to meet with the Armed Forces commander in the Azores and to preside over the inauguration of a sports gymnasium at the Lajes air base.

In the interview published in the morning daily ACORIANO ORIENTAL, Ferreira said there were "several advantages" to the inclusion of the Azores in the CINCIBERLANT [Iberian Atlantic Area Command].

"There is no reason," he said, "why we should not go ahead with our intention to include the Azores in this area.

"Quite the contrary," he continued, "we must try to settle this question once and for all, in the right way, in the appropriate forum and as quickly as possible."

The Azores are currently part of the area of the SACLANT [Supreme Allied Atlantic Command], headquartered in Norfolk (United States).

Orion P3 Bases in Azores

Lemos Ferreira announced that the ORION P3 planes used for sea patrol and anti-submarine warfare, which the Air Force will start to use within 2 to 3 years, will operated out of Lajes and Porto Santo.

The Armed Forces chief of staff admitted that the ORION would be used for exclusively national operations and could also act in bilateral coordination with the United States or within the general needs of NATO.

He noted that the airport facilities of Santa Maria "are of interest to the national military plan, on their own merit and not just as an alternative to the Lajes bases.

"Thus," he continued "the Armed Forces always keep close tabs on any projects related to Santa Maria."

Owing to what he called "huge budgetary restrictions" on the Armed Forces, Lemos Ferreira said there were no plans for the national military project for Santa Maria or for vacating the Fort of Sao Bras, in Ponta Delgado, the "cramped" headquarters of the Armed Forces commander for the Azores.

In the same interview, Lemos Ferreira denied there was any intention of building a general quarters devoted to NATO operations, with funding from infrastructures of the Atlantic Alliance.

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MILITARY

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

NEW NAVY DEPUTY CHIEF--The Superior Council of National Defense yesterday approved the appointment of Vice Adm Jorge Rasquillo Raposo as deputy chief of staff of the Navy. During the meeting, the council approved the appointment of Brig Gen Rafael Guerreiro Ferreira to the post of command of the Madeira Military Zone. Army officers Rogerio Augusto Garret da Silva e Casto and Manuel Ribeiro de Oliveira Carvalho were promoted from brigadier to general [ranks not further specified]. In the Navy, Paulo Joaquim Costa Teixeira and Antonio Maria de Sa Alves Sameiro were promoted from rear admiral to vice admiral. Arnaldo dos Santos Aguiar de Jesus was promoted from captain to rear admiral. The meeting, which was chaired by Ramalho Eanes, was held at Belem Palace and lasted about 2 hours. The Superior Council of National Defense also approved the strategic military concept, although with "some changes in formulation." In addition to the president of the republic and the prime minister, the council includes the Armed Forces chief of general staff, the other high military chiefs, the ministers of the republic, the presidents of the regional governments, two representatives from the parliament and the ministers of home administration, public equipment and transport, finance and others. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Dec 85 p 28] 0302

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ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

RADICAL CHANGES AFFECT SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

Lisbon TAL E QUAL in Portuguese 13 Dec 85 pp 8-9

[Article by Ferreira Pinto]

[Text] Just 15 years ago, Portugal had 14 workers paying into the Social Security system for each paid pensioner. Today, for 4 million contributing workers, there are about 2 million pensions to be paid out, a ratio of two workers to one beneficiary. The cake is not big enough to feed all the people at the table, and this is why the pensions and the retirement pay are so small.

Portuguese workers in industry, trade and service--those who contribute to Social Security (formerly, Insurance) are condemned by the state to be generous. Their contributions, together with the contributions of their employers, are paying the pensions of those who have already retired from the respective sectors and of their families. This is reasonable. However, there is little or no reason why they must also help to pay the pensions of hundreds of thousands of other citizens who have never paid into the system.

Nonetheless, this has been the case since the state decided to create a unified Social Security system. In expanding the system to the noncontributing brackets, the state promptly forgot to come up with the funds for the respective pensions. The result is obvious: Social Security is close to going into the financial "hole," and still the pensions and benefits granted are inadequate, both for those who have been paying in all their lives and for those who have never contributed.

From 1970 to 1985, the number of pensioners jumped from 165,000 to almost 2 million (12 times as many), while the value of the pensions paid went from 1.5 million contos to 192.5 million contos (128 times as much). This "explosive" growth is owing primarily to the aging population and the extension of Social Security to farm workers and to those who have never paid into the system.

Thus, 15 years ago there were 14 active workers for 1 pensioner. Today, this ratio is 2 to 1, a situation which the United States does not expect before the year 2010. Moreover, the increased number of pensioners far and above exceeded the increase in contributors and in the receipts. Naturally, dividing the cake among everyone meant a smaller piece for each one.

Social Security beneficiaries are divided among three systems: the general system (workers who contribute 8 percent of their wages, to which is added the 21 percent paid by their employers) and, in practice, the only system with its own revenues; the special system for rural workers (a system which contributes little); and the system for non-contributors. According to the bill for the unification of the welfare system, the state is obligated to contribute to the funding of the latter two systems, as well as to the so-called Social Action. But the state plays a role here which not even a Pilate....

Thus, in the last 3 years, the expenditures of the systems which put in little or nothing, as well as those of the Social Action, have risen to 176.5 million contos. The state budget, which should fund all of this, allocated only 40.3 million contos, or about 23 percent. The rest came out of contributions to the general system.

When all is said and done, in creating the Institute of Financial Management of Social Security, the state limited itself to functioning as the collector and redistributor of the monies. In practice, it distributes the misery among the communities. Thus the workers who put in their own funds (already financially integrated into the system) are worse off than they were. True, large segments of the population (specifically the rural and elderly population, who have never contributed) are receiving pensions which they did not have before, but, in the last analysis, pensions which are not enough to make a dent in poverty. In the end, it is the old politics of leveling downward.

Incidentally, the burden of the inactive population on the active population is such that the contributions this year (75 percent of total receipts) do not cover even 80 percent of current expenses, whereas 10 years ago the contributions exceeded expenses by 6 percent. On the other hand, the pensions for the current year (192.5 million contos) amount to 84 percent of the contributions. How can there be any decent family benefits and other subsidies for those who pay in?

To overcome the deficits resulting from the government's failure to fund the non-contributing systems, Social Security came to decapitalize itself, selling off certificates; the latter, which in 1975 amounted to 14.8 million contos (at 1975 prices) now amount to only 1.3 million contos. The logical corollary: to fill up the state's "hole," Social security also resorted to bank loans, which amounted to 7 million contos this year. To conclude, the system's debts will continue to grow and should reach 125 million contos by the end of the year (see below). Social security? The hole is in sight.

Bad debts: 125 Million Contos!

Under the protection of banking confidentiality, the debts owed to Social Security are flying high. That debt is growing at a rate of 2 million contos per month and should reach about 125 million contos by the end of the year. Who pays and who is in arrears is something that remains a secret of the protecting gods. But they always tell us, dear readers, that more than half the contributors are in arrears. And only 178 companies (0.2 percent of the debtors) are responsible for 40 percent of the bad debt. What an achievement!

Officially, at the end of 1985 "the debts will amount to about 96 million contos," according to a recent statement from the IGFSS [Institute of Financial Management of Social Security]. However, if one adds to that figure the debts turned into promissory notes by some contributors, the debt would really be 125 million contos. In 1984, the IGFSS put the debts at 74 million contos, excluding about 24 million contos in promissory notes and charges, which, until they are paid off, will continue to be a part of the Social Security debt.

With 187,000 contributing companies and institutions at the end of 1984, according to official IGFSS data, Social Security had 86,000 debtors (more than half the total number of contributors), responsible for an accumulated debt of 74.2 million contos. There were 41,500 debtors with debts exceeding 25 contos. Of these, 38,000 were private companies (with 58 million contos outstanding) and 186 were public and nationalized companies (8 million contos), so these two sectors together represented 66 million of the 74.2 million contos in arrears.

At the end of 1984, only 6,670 contributors (7 percent of the total debtors) had signed agreements to pay off their debt, but only 2,585 were meeting their payments. Moreover, there were 9,369 debtors who were not paying in anything at all--neither the company contributions nor employee withholdings.

In March 1985, not including the portion of the debt covered by promissory notes, the debt was already 80 million contos. There were 178 debtors owing 50,000 contos or more, representing about 32 million contos (40 percent of the total debt) and 2,084 contributors owed 5,000 contos or more. This 2 percent of the debtors accounted for about 57 million contos, a little over 70 percent of the debt. Finally, only 369 of those 2,084 contributors had established payment agreements, and only 102 were meeting those commitments in full.

Accumulated in the large companies, the debts to the Social Security system are concentrated geographically in Lisbon, Porto and Setubal. The regional centers of the three districts--responsible for receiving the contributions--showed a negative balance of 41 million contos at the end of 1984; contributors were 57.5 million contos in arrears to the country's 18 regional centers.

The rest of the debt was connected with the 26 company and sectoral insurance funds which have not yet been incorporated in the regional centers, although, financially, they are already integrated in the Social Security system. Of these 26 only 9 (Caixa de Seguros, Refinarias do Ultramar, Cimentos, Camera de Lisboa, TLP [Telephone Workers of Lisbon and Porto], Marconi, Soda Povia, Gas e Electricidade and Lusalite) did not show a negative balance for contributions.

The Railway Workers' Fund showed a negative balance of about 4 million contos. The fund of the Companhia Uniao Fabril e Associadas was 5 million contos short. The Journalists' Fund had yet to receive 199,000 contos from the companies in the sector and this debt increased by another 40,000 contos by May 1985.

Portugal and the EEC

Portugal has the lowest PIB (Gross Domestic Product) per capita (the EEC average is 4 times as high).

We spend about 13 percent of the PIB on Social Security (the EEC average is 28 percent).

We have the highest rate of contribution by companies and employees to Social Security revenues: 75.1 percent, as against 54.9 percent in the EEC.

We have the lowest rate of contributions by the government: 20 percent, as against 40 percent in the Common Market.

Between 1975 and 1980, our number of old age pensions increased by 3 times as much as they did in the Common Market. Their weight in the benefits paid out by the system is 44 percent, equalled only by the United Kingdom.

And we are joining the EEC! With the Social Security system we have now, it is obvious....

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ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

SAVING FROM LOAN RENEGOTIATION--The renegotiation of two foreign loans will result in a savings of 1 million contos. The agreement was signed yesterday in London by Vitor Constancio, governor of the Bank of Portugal. This agreement to refinance two loans, contracted in 1983 in the amount of \$650 million, will offer more favorable interest terms and will enable Portugal to reduce a large portion of the debt service. The renegotiation was made possible by the easing of the foreign exchange situation resulting from the financial management practiced in 1985. The success of the operation could open the way for the refinancing of other loans before very long. According to sources in the Bank of Brazil, there is really an "idea of proceeding with new refinancing agreements, although no program to this end has been established yet." [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Dec 85 p 5] 6362

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